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OVERSIGHT FAILURE IN SECURITIES
MARKETS
Yesha Yadav t
According to statute, securities exchanges play an essen-
tial role in ensuring compliance with applicable laws and in-
dustry standards. Long imagined as unique in their
institutional capacity to bring traders together, collect informa-
tion and exclude problem participants from the marketplace,
exchanges have offered an efficient source of private discipline
for public regulators. The classic conception of the exchange,
however, no longer holds true in today's markets. Rather than
concentrate activity within a handful of exchanges, equity
markets are fragmented across a network of thirteen ex-
changes and around forty lightly regulated, off-exchange al-
ternative venues (colloquially, "dark pools").
This Article shows that the goal of exchange oversight is
rendered unachievable in fragmented markets. First, ex-
changes no longer constitute the central forums for convening
traders, who now enjoy enormous choice regarding where and
how to trade. Fragmentation also increases the costs of per-
forming oversight and reduces its effectiveness. Exchanges
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must work harder to collect information across multiple ex-
changes and dark pools. Tough enforcement can result in lost
business. And the power to exclude traders from the ex-
change is weak where traders can move fluidly to other ve-
nues. Secondly, exchanges have incentives to underinvest in
oversight. They reap private gains by winning business, but
share the risks of losses with competitor exchanges and dark
pools.
This Article proposes a structural solution to motivate
stronger surveillance, outlining a new liability regime for ex-
changes and dark pools. Liability aligns the incentives of
trading venues toward delivering oversight. In so doing, it
helps recapture the benefits of consolidation, while maintain-
ing competition in market structure.
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INTRODUCTION
In December 2017, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit delivered a ruling that caught securities
exchanges by surprise. In City of Providence v. BATS Global
Markets, Inc., the court gave a green light to plaintiff investors
seeking to move forward with their class action against some of
the nation's best-known exchanges, including the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq. I The charge in the case:
1 City of Providence v. BATS Global Markets, Inc., 878 F.3d 36 (2d Cir.
2017).
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the exchanges stood accused of selling data feeds and location
rights that resulted in a select group of traders-ultra-fast,
high-frequency traders-enjoying systematically better access
to trading opportunities than others.2 As a consequence, the
plaintiffs alleged, their own ability to transact on a level playing
field was diminished, forcing them to routinely lose out to these
high-speed, high-paying traders.
3
The element of surprise, however, arose less from the alle-
gations themselves, and more from the fact that the court al-
lowed the lawsuit to progress at all. It is well established that
exchanges have long benefited from a broad immunity against
suits owing to their special status as private regulators of se-
curities markets.4 In return for enforcing securities rules and
industry standards, regulation has insulated exchanges ex-
pansively from the threat of expensive, investor lawsuits.5 In
this instance, the Second Circuit underscored the distinction
between the dual roles of exchanges as regulators on the one
hand, and exchanges as for-profit, commercial entities on the
other.6 When offering proprietary products, like access to data
2 See id. at 42-43.
3 See id. For a discussion of these practices and their implications, see
generally Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L. REV. 968
(2016) [hereinafter Yadav, Insider Tr-ading].
4 See, e.g., Exchange Act § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b) (2012) (stipulating re-
quirements for any entity that seeks to become an exchange, to include, for
example, governance standards for members). For discussion, see Roberta S.
Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered
Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 151, 163-65 (2008) (examining
the history of what eventually became the Nasdaq exchange). For an excellent
comparative survey and analysis of exchanges and their regulatory function, see
Stavros Gadinis & Howell E. Jackson, Markets as Regulators: A Survey, 80 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1239, 1244 (2007) (noting that exchanges in the eight jurisdictions sur-
veyed maintained some self-regulatory function and responsibility in oversight-
but with varying levels of intensity of government supervision). See also Chris J.
Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws, 75 U. CHI.
L. REv. 1435, 1452 (2008) ("Stock exchanges are not only venues for trading; they
also help regulate the markets they organize.").
5 See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. NASD, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir.
1998) (immunity for exchanges in their exercise of quasi-governmental power);
Barbara v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 99 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996) (giving
exchanges immunity for suits arising out of disciplinary proceedings). But see
Weissman v. NASD, Inc. (Weissman IV), 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007)
(distinguishing between acts carried out in the commercial interests of exchanges
and their regulatory power). For discussion, see Exchange Act § 6(b)(1) & (5);
Exchange Act § 15A(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2012); D.L. Cromwell Inv., Inc.
v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2002) (criminal sanction arising
from the exercise of exchange censure); Craig Springer, Weissman v. NASD: Pierc-
ing the Veil of Absolute Immunity of an SRO under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451 (2008).
6 See BATS Global Markets, Inc., 878 F.3d at 46-48.
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or to their location services, exchanges were acting in the latter
capacity and thus could not expect to be immunized against
suit.7 By highlighting the significance of these contrasting
roles, the Second Circuit pointed to the complicated place of
modem exchanges in securities regulation, relied on and re-
warded for their supervision, while still remaining deeply be-
holden to the business of trading.8
This fundamental tension between an exchange's public
function and its private interests faces a fresh challenge in
modem markets. For well over a decade, regulation has
pushed exchanges to compete in delivering trading services.
Rather than allow exchanges to extract private rents from their
position-by charging investors high fees for transactions, for
example-policy has favored requiring trading venues to com-
pete with one another.9 Central to achieving this aim has been
the formalizing of lightly regulated trading venues-so-called
alternative trading systems (ATS) or dark pools within the mar-
ketplace. ATS offer investors a platform to transact in publicly
traded equity once these securities have been listed on an ex-
change (notably, the NYSE or Nasdaq). 1o Instead of exchanges
being solely authorized to capture all the secondary trading in
the securities they list, regulation creates a "market" for the
provision of trading services. By making exchanges and dark
pools compete to attract secondary market trades, investors
can enjoy increased choice and heightened efficiencies in capi-
tal allocation where prices do not reflect a bundle of bloated
transaction costs."
7 See id. at 48.
8 See id. at 46-47.
9 See infra subpart II.A.
10 It should be noted that not all national exchanges list securities. Ex-
changes divide into those that list securities and those that trade the securities of
companies that are listed on another exchange. The two major listing exchanges
are the NYSE and the Nasdaq. For discussion on the significance of exchanges
and their continuing role in the listing process, see Onnig H. Dombalagian, Ex-
changes, Listless?: The Disintermediation of the Listing Function, 50 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 579, 581, 587-88, 597-99 (2015). On the obligation to execute trade at the
best price, see Regulation National Market System Rule 611, Order Protection
Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2005). Some venues offer certain services to attract
orders to their venue. See, e.g., IEX Announces: Displayed Orders and Non-Pro-
tected Top of Book Quote Feed, IEX (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.iextrading.com/
trading/alerts/ 2014/023/ [https://perma.cc/5AGU-HZPW] [hereinafter IEX
Trading Alert 023]; About IFX, IEX, http: //www.iextrading. com/about/ [https://
perma.cc/36H3-U5GN] [hereinafter About IEX].
11 Nathaniel Popper, As Market Heats Up, Trading Slips Into Shadows, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/business/as-
market-heats-up-trading-slips-into-shadows.html [https://perma.cc/5T42-
NXE4] (on investors choosing to trade on dark pools because of the lower trans-
1802 [Vol. 104:1799
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Unsurprisingly, given their lower regulatory compliance
burden and no real mandate to oversee securities markets,
dark pools have succeeded in quickly capturing a large chunk
of the trading business. In addition to thirteen national ex-
changes, 12 stocks trades on around forty ATS of varying sizes
and types. 13 Whereas the NYSE once attracted around 80% of
trading volume in the equity it listed, its group of exchanges
now handle only around 24% of U.S. equity volume, with Nas-
daq at approximately 20%.14 Dark pools, by contrast, have
parency requirements); see infra subpart II.B. On Electronic Communication
Networks within the taxonomy of ATS, see Laura Tuttle, SEC DIV. OF ECON. & RISK
ANALYSIS, ALTERNATIVE TRADING SYSTEMS: DESCRIPTION OF ATS TRADING IN NATIONAL
MARKET SYSTEM STOCKS, 9-10 (Oct. 2013). For a current list of exchanges author-
ized under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange Act, see Exchanges, SEC. & EXCH.
COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrexchanges.shtml [https:/
/perma.cc/Q9VH-NXRX].
12 See Alternative Trading System ("ATS") Lis SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://
www.sec.gov/fola/docs/atslist.htm [https://perma.cc/EV9F-UERX] (last up-
dated Aug. 2019). For a list of national exchanges currently registered with the
SEC, see National Securities Exchanges, SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec
.gov/fast-answers/divisionsmarketregmrexchangesshtml.html [https://perma
.cc/985M-MTRF] (last updated June 21, 2019). It should be noted that, as of the
time of writing, the newest stock exchange, the Long-Term Stock Exchange, has
not yet fully launched its operations. See The Long-Term Stock Exchange Receives
Approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission to Operate a National
Securities Exchange, LONG TERM STOCK EXCH., https://longtermstockexchange
.com/news/ltse-receives-approval-from-sec [https://perma.cc/P927-7DG6] (last
updated Sept. 9, 2019).
13 Determining the number of ATS is quite problematic. ATS can also include
electronic crossing networks (or ECNs) that disseminate order-related information
to their users and match buy and sell orders between their clients. These net-
works thus have transparency, unlike other ATS venues that do not have to
display pre-trade price information. This Article uses the number of platforms
that report active weekly trading data to FINRA. It should be noted that FINRA
can exempt certain ATS from the reporting requirement. The number of ATS, of
varying degrees and types of trading activity, registered with the SEC is usually
larger. This number is constantly in flux. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, ATS List, (see
January 2018 data), https://www.sec.gov/fola/docs/atslist.htm [https://perma.
cc/SL4Q-U7FG]; FINRA, ATS TRANSPARENCY DATA, https://ats.fimra.org/Trad-
ingParticipants [https://perma.cc/4SDM-UMQD]; FINRA, EQUITY ATS FIRMS (Feb.
28, 2019), http://www.fimra.org/industry/equity-ats-flrms [https://perma.cc/N
LU9-FU26]. For discussion, see Maureen O'Hara & Mao Ye, Is Market Fragmenta-
tion Harming Market Quality?, 100 J. FIN. ECON. 459, 459 (2011) ("One of the more
striking changes in U.S. equity markets has been the proliferation of trading
venues."); Sam Mamudi & Annie Massa, Dark Pools: Private Stock Trading vs.
Public Exchanges, BLOOMBERG QUICK TAKE (July 21, 2017), http://www.bloom-
bergview.com/quicktake/dark-pools [https://perma.cc/7H7M-KU3H].
14 BATS, VOLUME SUMMARY, https://www.bats.com/us/equities/market_statis
tics/ [https://perma.cc/7VTS-84RP] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); NASDAQ, EQUITY
MARKET SHARE STATISTICS, http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader.aspx?id=market
share [https://perma.cc/V4AM-NWDH]. For example, Nasdaq's main equity
trading platform (the Nasdaq Stock Market) has a share of U.S. equities at around
18.2% overall. Its share of trading securities listed on its own exchange was 28.7%
and its share of trading NYSE-listed securities was around 13.3%. Tape A mea-
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gained an increasing slice of the pie, attracting around 35% of
U.S. equity trading volume in 2019.15
This Article argues that policy's focus on competition-and
the fragmentation that has resulted-has rendered it near im-
possible for exchanges to provide effective oversight in securi-
ties markets. It makes three contributions.
First, the Article shows that fragmentation generates enor-
mous logistical and institutional costs for exchanges seeking to
monitor, surveille, and discipline. Exchanges work best by
convening a large number of users within their venue. 16 Num-
bers help traders find one another and strike deals.17 They
generate "network externalities," whereby a large number of
users attracts even greater numbers owing to the benefits of an
active, efficient marketplace. ' 8 From the perspective of regula-
tion, numbers enable exchanges to deliver efficient oversight. 19
sures refer to NYSE-listed securities, Tape B to securities listed on regional ex-
changes and Tape C to Nasdaq listed securities. For discussion, see BATS
TRADING, MARKET VOLUME SUMMARY HELP, https://www.batstrading.com/mar-
ketsummary/help/ [https://perma.cc/5AMJ-YUL2]; see also Mark Fahey, Dark
Pools Still Popular, Despite Year of Regulatory Concern, CNBC (Feb. 1, 2016),
https: //www.cnbc.com/2016/02/01/regulators-may-dislike-dark-pools-but-in-
vestors-love-them.htrnl [https: //perma.cc/8BJ9-VDPF].
15 BATS, VOLUME SUMMARY, https://www.bats.com/us/equities/marketstatis
tics/ [https://perma.cc/2H85-Z6KL] (last visited Sept. 27, 2019); TABB FORUM,
EQUITIES LIQUIDITY MATRIX (Nov. 2018), http://tabbforum.com/liquidity-matrix
[https://perma.cc/5MVK-AE55]; TABB FORUM, EQUITIES LIQUIDITY MATRIX (Dec.
2015), https: //www. scribd.com/fullscreen/295992285?access-key=key-
eD9kGCLxPJwWFCb4Fssn&allowshare=false&escape=false&showrecommen
dations=false&view mode=slideshow [https: //perma.cc/Z7HF-GSKKI.
16 ALVIN ROTH, WHO GETS WHAT AND WHY? THE NEW ECONOMICS OF MATCHMAKING
AND MARKET DESIGN 8-10 (2015) (noting, generally, the need for large numbers for
a marketplace. However, Professor Roth discusses various types of markets de-
pending on the kind of purpose it is designed to fulfill, e.g., organ transplants,
student-college matches, etc.).
17 Id. at 4-10; see also Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4, at 1268-71 (noting
the different models of exchanges and state regulation). The Nasdaq and the
NYSE, for example, exemplify alternative models. The Nasdaq has traditionally
been a "dealer" market in which designated "dealers" for particular securities
intermediated the flow of trades.
18 Haim Mendelson, Consolidation, Fragmentation, and Market Performance,
22 J. FIN. & QUANTTATIVE ANALYSIS 189 (1987) (observing the benefits of market
consolidation and network externalities for exchanges); Marco Pagano, Trading
Volume and Asset Liquidity, 104 Q.J. ECON. 255 (1989) (observing network exter-
nalities with liquidity likely to flow to markets with higher degrees of
consolidation).
19 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4, at 1277-79; Jonathan R. Macey & Hideki
Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm- The Emergence of Close Substitutes for the
New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007, 1007-10 (1990)
(analyzing the signaling function of listing and exchange regulation); Paul G.
Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L REV. 1453, 1459-64 (1997) (detail-
ing the historic evolution of exchange regulation of their members through con-
tract rules as well as checks on conduct and creditworthiness).
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A repeat base of users provides information; it develops and
hones an exchange's expertise over time; and it amplifies an
exchange's disciplinary power by giving real teeth to its threat
to exclude a user from an essential economic resource.
20
Fragmentation damages the capacity of an exchange to
conduct oversight by sharply reducing the number of users
that an exchange attracts. This dramatic thinning of the user
base harms the delivery of exchange oversight in key ways. For
a start, the logistical costs of monitoring and discipline rise
sharply. Whereas an exchange like the NYSE might once have
seen almost 80%-100% of all trading in its listed securities,
this figure now hovers around the 20% mark or less through-
out the trading day.2 1 An exchange must work harder to
gather information on the traders that cross its floor. Far from
simply looking within its own venue, it must monitor and also
coordinate with an ever-expanding multiplicity of less-regu-
lated dark pools that also host trading in listed securities.
But a fragmented market structure also gives fraudsters,
insider-traders, or manipulators choice about where to trans-
act-on exchanges or on opaque dark pools. This can en-
courage bad apples to creatively craft opportunistic, disruptive
strategies designed to avoid detection.22 Without cooperation
between platforms, an exchange will struggle to enforce compli-
ance with securities rules.23 Where the information and coor-
dination costs of enforcement are high, exchanges will be
selective about enforcement choices, confining interventions to
obvious and egregious breaches or those whose impact will be
widely felt. Critically, the impact of exchange discipline will be
weakened if traders can easily switch business to less regu-
lated platforms like dark pools.
2 4
20 George Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Mar-
ket Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970); Harold Demsetz, The Cost of Transact-
ing, 82 Q.J. ECON. 33 (1968); Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask
and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Trad-
ers, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985); Macey & Kanda, supra note 19, 1020-21.
21 See SIFMA, SIFMA INSIGHTS: US EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE PRIMER 12
(2018), https://www.sifma.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/SIFMA-Insights-
EMS-Primer FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/GBS4-VFBU]; see also supra note 10.
22 See Ananth Madhavan, Market Microstructure: A Survey, 3 J. FIN. MKTS.
205, 216-18 (2000) (noting finance studies that suggest that large block trades do
not predominantly point to insider trading but that insiders tend to medium size
block trades in instances of insider trading); United States v. Sarao, No. 15 CR 75,
2016 WL 8792307 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 9, 2016) (on the use of orders to undertake a
manipulate strategy on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
23 Macey & Kanda, supra note 19, 1020-21.
24 John McCrank, Luminex 'Dark Pool' Enlists 73 Members Ahead of Trading
Launch, REUTERS (Oct. 4, 2015, 9:01 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/lumi
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In addition, lower volumes of business-and fierce compe-
tition between venues-deepen the conflicts of interest inher-
ent in the notion of for-profit exchanges disciplining those that
bring them business. As noted in City of Providence, it is well-
trodden ground that for-profit exchanges represent somewhat
problematic overseers of the market.2 5 Why would any rational
exchange zealously monitor, discipline, and exclude those
traders that bring it the most business? How much capital can
a revenue-hungry exchange reasonably invest in building an
expensive regulatory apparatus to fulfill a public good? Cer-
tainly, exchanges internalize private benefits when those using
their venue are well behaved. But their efforts are designed to
confer benefits to the market as a whole beyond just their own
institution.26 This core conflict has never been satisfactorily
addressed as exchanges have continued to perform their over-
sight function. Fragmentation, however, imports a particularly
challenging dimension.
With fragmentation, exchanges are internalizing higher
costs of oversight while seeing less volume and reduced reve-
nues from trading.27 Facing competition from cheaper, less-
regulated dark pools, exchanges have to work hard to win mar-
ket share. This can lead exchanges to seek revenues more
aggressively, by selling a variety of side services (e.g., data and
technology) and growing thicker commercial relations between
themselves and their users. For example, exchanges routinely
reward high-volume traders that agree to bring order flow to
the venue.28 These complex business entanglements raise the
cost to an exchange of overseeing and punishing problem trad-
ers. Not only can an exchange lose trading business, but po-
tentially also interest from their customers in a host of other
revenue-generative services. Furthermore, this loss represents
a competitor's gain. When a trader wants to avoid a strict
nex-stocks-idUSL1N 1240G720151005?virtualBrandChannel= 11563 [https://
perma.cc/38KZ-E97T] (a new off-exchange venue set up by institutional Investors
and asset managers).
25 See infra subpart I.C.
26 See id.
27 See iCL
28 Exchanges can offer traders incentives to trade on their venue, for exam-
ple, in the form of "maker taker fees." These fee arrangements are designed such
that traders that provide ("make") liquidity for others pay a lower fee to trade on
the exchange than those that "take" liquidity. These arrangements seek to en-
courage passive market makers to transact on the exchange. For discussion and
critique of these fee arrangements, see generally, Stanislav Dolgopolov, The
Maker-Taker Pricing Model and its Impact on the Securities Market Structure: A Can
of Worms for Securities Fraud?, 8 VA. L. Bus. REv. 231 (2014).
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exchange, it can take its business to another platform. The
exercise of oversight represents a particularly poor business
proposition in fragmented markets. In their competing duty to
their shareholders and to the public, exchanges appear espe-
cially conflicted and maybe unable to satisfactorily achieve
either.
Second, this Article shows that trading venues possess few
incentives to cooperate in overcoming the problems of fragmen-
tation.2 9 High coordination and information costs suggest hat
trading venues should gain by cooperating in surveillance. By
pooling information and sharing monitoring costs through co-
operation, venues can mimic the benefits of consolidation in
oversight, even while competing in other areas.
But there is little incentive for exchanges and dark pools to
cooperate. Indeed, their incentives may be skewed toward pri-
vately underinvesting precisely because they collectively share
the risks of failure. The design of the national market encour-
ages venues to compete for private gain but to share the costs
of failing to monitor properly.3 0
Regulation mandates that securities trade where they are
on offer at the best price.3 1 Once listed on a national exchange,
securities can trade freely across the system of exchanges and
dark pools with the goal of allowing investors to execute their
trades on the platform that offers the best deal or some other
29 See Regulation National Market System Rule 611, Order Protection Rule,
17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2005); Jacob Bunge, NYSE Adjusts Charges in Bid to Draw
Traders, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB12336215
2140241649 [https://perma.cc/X2BA-V2V5] (noting that the NYSE lowered
charges and increased trading speeds in a bid to attract volume away from off-
exchange venues and newer competitors like BATS and Direct Edge exchanges).
30 See David A. Lipton, The SEC or the Exchanges: Who Should Do What and
When? A Proposal to Allocate Regulatory Responsibilities for Securities Markets, 16
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 527, 528-29 (1983) (analyzing early statements by Justice
William Douglas suggesting that exchanges held a primary role in market
supervision).
31 On monopolistic rent seeking, see, for example, the practice of exchanges
fixing set brokerage commissions to trade shares, such that brokers charging
reduced commissions could be expelled from the exchange. Brokerage commis-
sions to trade 10 shares were the same as those to trade 1,000 or 100,000 shares,
shielding brokerages and exchanges from competition on fees. For discussion,
see, e.g., Jason Zweig, The Day Wall Street Changed, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2015,
10:35 AM), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/04/30/the-day-that-
changed-wall-street-forever/ [https://perma.cc/NT5N-W5WM]. On collusion on
the Nasdaq, see generally William G. Christie & Paul H. Schultz, Why Do NASDAQ
Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?, 49 J. FIN. 1813 (1994) (showing that
Nasdaq market-makers padded the spreads that they charged investors); Prajit
Dutta & Ananth Madhavan, Competition and Collusion in Dealer Markets, 52 J.
FIN. 245 (1997) (observing collusive pressures in dealer markets like the Nasdaq).
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advantage sought by the investor.32 By most accounts, this
strategy has worked to reduce the various fees that investors
pay as a part of trading.33 It has also resulted in an operation-
ally interconnected market structure, without which such fo-
rum shopping would be impossible.34 Information must flow
freely across the market to advertise the best price for a secur-
ity. Traders too must be able to move easily across venues to
transact where it suits them best. As finance scholars note,
this means that markets can be efficient in transmitting infor-
mation across venues; they can also be quick in spreading
error, fraud, and the ill-effects of risky oversight from one
venue to the next.
3 5
Two implications arise out of this competitive, fragmented
dynamic. One, venues can privately gain by the exercise of lax
oversight. They can attract business to their platform through
the promise of lower fees, light monitoring, and weak disci-
pline. They can also out-compete other venues by generating
sufficient business to spur network benefits that can further
lower transaction costs for users. And two, competition be-
tween trading venues offers ample motivation to exercise poor
oversight because venues in a fragmented market do not inter-
nalize the full costs of their failure. Rather, with traders and
information moving easily from one venue to the next, lax ve-
nues can partially externalize the costs of their suboptimal
oversight to others. Exercising robust oversight makes little
sense for individual platforms. Venues within a market where
risks spread easily from one to the next can still lose even if
they take costly precautions. If venues are periodically paying
for someone else's risk-taking, because they are impacted by
the bad behavior of others, it makes sense to also take risks-
and accrue customers-from time to time.
In conclusion, this Article offers a proposal to rebuild ex-
change oversight in fragmented markets. That exchanges are
now diminished in their ability to fulfill their statutory mandate
is economically of serious concern-even if relying on private
32 Regulation National Market System Rule 611, Order Protection Rule, 17
C.F.R. § 242.611 (2005).
33 See, e.g., Bunge, supra note 29.
34 Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in Modem Markets, 102 VA. L. REV.
1031, 1090-96 (2016) [hereinafter Yadav, Liability] (analyzing the effectiveness of
the liability framework to protect markets from some of the risks of algorithmic
trading).
35 Austin Gerig, High-Frequency Trading Synchronizes Prices in Financial Mar-
kets (Jan. 1, 2015) (unpublilshed manuscriipt), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=2 173247 [https://perrna.cc/CWB9-8RLAI.
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exchanges to police public markets has always been controver-
sial. Ultimately, a failure by exchanges to properly exert mar-
ket discipline raises questions about the viability of markets to
function as a secure and reliable mechanism to allocate capi-
tal. Where policy is focused simply on reducing front-end in-
vestor costs (e.g., lower fees or heightened secrecy) without also
tackling deficits in oversight, investors can end up paying, al-
beit in different ways. Ultimately, markets, as a whole, can
suffer where oversight failure causes investors to discount the
value of their capital or otherwise to stop investing altogether.
This Article suggests removing the qualified immunity en-
joyed by exchanges to make exchanges-and ark pools-more
fully liable for costly disruptions arising on account of oversight
failure. Building on earlier writings, this Article outlines a de-
sign for a new liability regime for exchanges and dark pools.
The rationale underlying greater liability for trading venues is
straightforward. Liability can better ensure that exchanges
and dark pools have a real economic stake in delivering effec-
tive oversight. Importantly, liability levers shift the cost-benefit
trade-offs faced by trading venues when determining how best
to calibrate the intensity of their supervision. In increasing the
costs and consequences of oversight failure, this Article seeks
to better align the private incentives of trading venues toward
the public good. Recognizing that oversight failure can gener-
ate large losses, owing to the quick-fire spread of risks through
the system, this Article also outlines a proposal for an industry
fund to pay out to investors in the event of a costly fallout.
Such a fund should further encourage venues to police each
other and take credible steps to share information and coordi-
nate in helping exchanges oversee securities markets more
effectively.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I sets out the
foundational role of exchanges in securities regulation and en-
forcement. Part II examines the modem turn toward market
fragmentation, highlighting the tension between oversight and
competition. Part III analyzes the implications of market frag-
mentation for the quality of exchange oversight and capital
allocation. Part IV proposes ideas for reform, outlining a new
liability regime for exchanges and dark pools.
I
THE ROLE OF EXCHANGES IN SECURITIES REGULATION
Exchanges constitute the structural backbone of securities
markets. In providing an organized space for traders, ex-
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changes bring market participants together to transact, to pool
information, and to monitor one another in accordance with an
agreed-upon set of rules.3 6 This Part outlines the role of an
exchange in capital allocation and market oversight. It high-
lights two dueling policy objectives guiding regulation.37 On
the one hand, regulation relies heavily on exchanges to police
markets, enforce securities laws and industry norms. On the
other, regulatory policy also favors greater competition in the
provision of trading services. These contrasting priorities have
resulted in a heavily fragmented network of trading venues,
that includes exchanges but also less-formal, lightly regulated
ATS, colloquially termed "dark pools."3 8 With fragmentation
forcing exchanges to work harder to compete as well as dividing
user volume between multiple venues, this Part highlights the
challenge facing exchanges in meeting both policy objectives of
oversight and competition.
A. Markets and the Demand for Exchanges
Securities markets transfer capital from investors to busi-
nesses that can use this wealth for growth. A number of costs
make it difficult to realize this goal. First, information is
needed to understand and value the risks of investments; and
secondly, the risks of this capital must be easily transferable to
motivate investors to enter the market in the first place.
39
36 See generally Andreas M. Fleckner & Klaus J. Hopt, Stock Exchange Law:
Concept, History, Challenges, 7 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 513 (2013) (providing a history
of the evolution of the stock exchange and regulation undergirding their function).
37 MICHAEL LEwis, FLASH Boys: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014); ScoTT PATTERSON,
DARK POOLs: THE RISE OF THE MACHINE TRADERS AND THE RIGGING OF THE U.S. STOCK
MARKET 322-33 (2013). Regulators have launched widely publicized actions on
issues of microstructure. Keri Geiger & Sam Mamudi, High-Speed Trading Faces
New York Probe into Fairness, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.bloom-
berg.corn/news/articles/2014-03-18/high-speed-trading-said-to-face-n-y-
probe-into-fairness [https://perma.cc/5772-ZANR; Kara Scannell & Nicole Bul-
lock, SEC Fines NYSE Euronext $4.5m for Breaking Rules, FIN. TIMES (May 1,
2014), https: //www.ft.com/content/578b5124-d 14b- 11 e3-8 1 eO-00 144feabdcO
[https://perma.cc/DUV8-FQPZI.
38 See, e.g., Madhavan, supra note 22 (providing a literature survey on some
aspects of market design); O'Hara & Ye, supra note 13. For a discussion of the
literature, see generally Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4. On the international
regulation of exchanges, see Brummer, supra note 4.
39 See generally Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of
Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006) (arguing that Information genera-
tion constitutes a central imperative of securities regulation and that encouraging
information traders ought to be goal of the regulatory framework); Zohar Goshen
& Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and "Negative" Property
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REv. 1229 (2001) (examining insider trading laws
and proposing an allocation of informational benefits to information traders).
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Information: Companies raise money by issuing securities
such as a share or a bond. These securities confer a bundle of
rights on investors, notably an entitlement to claim some share
of a company's future earnings, through a dividend in the case
of equity, or a fixed portion of its cash flows in the case of a
bond.40 In deciding how much capital they should place at
risk, investors need information to determine the likelihood of
actually receiving the entitlements that they have been prom-
ised. This data helps investors to "price" the claim.4 1 In the
example of equity, a company with strong credentials-likely to
generate future cash flows for investors-should command a
high price per share. Conversely, a risky profile will prompt
rational investors to reduce what they pay for claims, such that
they will "discount" what they invest to reflect observable
risks.42 Ideally, a promising company wishes to minimize dis-
counting, seeking to capture as much capital from investors as
it can get (and deserves). In turn, investors receive an entitle-
ment to cash flows that reflect their desired return on capital.
Capital is allocated most effectively when issuers can secure its
fullest value, discounted to precisely reflect its riskiness.43
Trading Costs: But investors can also be put off by the
logistical and economic costs attached to purchasing and trad-
ing a security. Rationally, investors should discount what they
invest in response.
Importantly, those that purchase securities do not always
wish to hold these investments on an open-ended basis. They
would like to be able to exit at a good moment, transferring the
risk to another investor that wishes to assume it and recover-
ing the capital they have left in the venture. If investors are
unable to trade their risks, or where this transaction becomes
too expensive, investors should discount the capital they invest
in response to the risk of being locked-in to the consequences
of a single decision. Ultimately, the absence of secondary trad-
ing hurts companies seeking capital. When investors reduce
40 RICHARD BREALEY, STEwART MYERS & FRANKLiN ALLEN, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 45-104 (10th ed. 2011) (describing the salient features of key security
instruments and their valuation).
41 Id. at 74-85.
42 Id. For a summary on valuation and risk discounting, see, for example,
Aswath Damodaran, Equity Risk Premiums: Determinants, Estimation and Implica-
tions, 11-14 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), pages.stem.nyu.edu/-adamodar
[perma.cc/ZRL6-RPW6] (select "writing," then "papers," then the "2013 Edition"
link under "The Equity Risk Premium"). By reduction, investors may decrease
what they invest or charge a company more for the capital to reflect the perceived
riskiness of their investment.
43 Damodaran, supra note 42.
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what they are willing to put into the market because of the high
costs of on-selling their risk, businesses that need capital face
a shallower pool of investors to access.
4 4
Investors that wish to buy or sell securities in the secon-
dary market face a number of expensive logistical hurdles with-
out an exchange in the picture. For a start, they must find
each other. An investor wishing to sell 100 shares of Public
Company must seek out another investor that is willing to
enter into the other side of the deal. Searches are a problem
where investors are dispersed and whose trading intentions are
not explicit. In addition to finding a counterparty, traders must
also be prepared to face negotiation costs in reaching a bar-
gain. Such discussions may be time consuming, necessitating
legal input and subject to complex bargaining. Pervasive
search and negotiation costs will slow down the pace of secon-
dary trading, increasing further the cost of capital.45 Finally,
counterparties have to be able to rely on one another to honor
the terms of the negotiated bargain.46 Where a market includes
fraudsters, cheats, and manipulators, such trust is likely to be
elusive and lacking credibility.
Search costs and concerns about the riskiness of contract
parties point to tensions in a trading system that leaves eco-
nomic relationships to be regulated informally between two
players.47 Traders might only reveal information on trades and
prices on an ad hoc basis, leaving swathes of the market with-
44 ICL
45 See Craig Pirrong, A Theory of Financial Exchange Organization, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 437, 439-40 (noting the problems of bilateral dealings in the securities
marketplace).
46 On counterparty risk, see Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Central Clearing:
Theory and Practice 2-7 (Int'l Swaps & Derivatives Ass'n, Discussion Papers Se-
ries, No. 1, 2011).
47 The market for over-the-counter swaps provides an example of a market
where trading has been undertaken bilaterally between sophisticated parties.
From 2001, legislation provided space for traders to transact in swaps essentially
outside of federal oversight and relying on industry conventions to maintain eco-
nomic bargains. This market has been widely criticized as generating large risks
for the financial system owing to a lack of transparency, ad hoc risk management,
and contributing to the global financial crisis in 2007-08. For discussion and
analysis of this bilateral market, see generally Bushan Jomadar, The ISDA Master
Agreement - The Rise and Fall of a Major Financial Instrument (Westminster Busi-
ness School, Working Paper, 2007), https: //papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=1326520 [https://perma.cc/5M4U-ZKL5]; ATLANTIC COUNCIL DIVER-
GENCE REPORT 1, 29-31 http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/
Danger-of_DivergenceTransatlanticFinancial Reform_1-22.pdf [https://perma
.cc/B7WY-2AHW]. For a discussion on the private regulation of risk, see Randall
S. Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development
of Derivatives Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations, 31 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 596, 598-606 (1999).
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out a reliable reserve of data with which to value securities and
issuer companies.4 8 This lack of transparency can also allow
room for disruptive traders to flourish. In the absence of dis-
closure and oversight, a single trader can create larger risks
than she can manage, forcing the market to bear the conse-
quences of her failure.49
Bilateral economic relationships, then, can prove problem-
atic for capital markets. In an environment where private disci-
pline constitutes the primary means of securing good conduct,
the costs of self-protection can create a barrier to entry for
market participants. In other words, securities trading can
become the preserve of deep-pocketed, powerful traders who
either have the means to enforce discipline from others, or who
can stand to absorb the risks of externalities created by badly
behaved peers. Capital markets and their ability to allocate
capital can suffer deeply as a result. As Professors Ronald J.
Gilson and Reinier H. Kraakman famously observe, markets
work best where they play host to a heterogeneous mix of trad-
ers, large and small, informed and uninformed, whose interac-
tions generate the information needed to convey a fuller
understanding of what public companies are worth.5 0 If mar-
kets are too hostile for all but a handful of the most hardy of
traders, their ability to foster a rich interplay between market
participants deteriorates markedly.51 Capital allocation suffers
in two important ways: (i) companies seeking capital have ac-
48 The literature on private ordering is extensive. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (examining the effectiveness of
private monitoring and adjudication mechanisms in the grain industry); Barak D.
Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory
of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004) (offering a taxonomy of private
ordering models); Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions: Spontaneous and
Intentional Governance, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 159, 167-71 (1991) (examining
reputational sanction as a source of private discipline).
49 LARRY HARRIS, TRADING AND ExCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTI-
TIONERS 3-8 (2003).
50 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman,
Mechanisms] (analyzing information efficiency and the process of generating effi-
cient prices); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, 7he Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003);
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial
Crisis: It's Still a Matter of Information Costs (Columbia Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 470, 2014) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Information Costs] (arguing
that market efficiency constitutes the best, albeit imperfect, proxy for under-
standing the real value of companies); see also James Dow, Itay Goldstein &
Alexander Guembel, Incentives for Information Production in Markets Where Prices
Affect Real Investment, 15 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N 877 (2017).
51 On information efficiency, see discussion, infra subparts I.A-B.
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cess to a smaller pool of investors; and (ii) information on these
companies becomes shallower as well as distorted where prices
reflect a slew of complex transaction costs.
B. Exchanges and Capital Allocation
Exchanges institutionalize efforts by securities traders to
collectively reduce the information, disciplinary, and transac-
tion costs inherent to trading.52 First, exchanges set ground
rules for the companies that wish to list their securities on the
venue, ensuring that they conform to standards of financial
robustness, governance, and organizational viability.
53 This
helps to reassure investors that companies issuing claims to
the public possess the reserves to make good on their
promises. Secondly, an exchange brings investors together to
trade these listed securities with one another in accordance
with set rules.5 4 Traditionally, exchanges have limited mem-
bership to firms with demonstrated expertise in matching in-
vestors with one another (brokers) as well as in purchasing
securities for their own books (dealers).
5 5 Firms that can
match buyers and sellers of securities, as well as those ready to
put their own money on the line to facilitate trade, help gener-
ate volume for the exchange.
5 6
Network Externalities: Exchanges thus seek to capture and
build networks of traders and information to allocate capital
more efficiently. Exchanges function best by bringing a large
52 Pirrong, supra note 45, at 437-42.
53 Onnig Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange: Reconciling Self-
Regulation and the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REv. 1069, 1072-79
(2005); Roberta S. Karmel, The Future of Corporate Governance Listing Require-
ments, 54 S.M.U. L. REv. 325 (2001).
54 See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 4, at 159-60 (noting the origins of the New
York Stock Exchange from 1792 when it was established following high volatility
in the nascent U.S. government securities market). The NYSE was initially formed
by twenty-four brokers pursuant to the Buttonwood Tree Agreement. For a collec-
tion of key sources describing the history of the NYSE, see Ellen Terrell, History of
the New York Stock Exchange, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (Oct. 2012), https://www.loc
.gov/rr/business/hottopic/stock-market.html [https://perma.cc/G8YL-&J9N].
55 Exchange Act § 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(3) (2012); Exchange Act
§ 15A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(4) (2012). For discussion, see Dombalagian,
supra note 53, at 1072-79; Karmel, supra note 4, at 160-63. On the role of
dealers in maintaining market liquidity and pricing, see generally Yakov Amihud
& Haim Mendelson, Dealership Market: Market-Making and Inventory, 8 J. FIN.
ECON. 31 (1980) (detailing the function of dealers on the market, who buy and sell
on their own account to maintain market liquidity); Katrina Ellis, Roni Michaely &
Maureen O'Hara, The Making of a Dealer Market: From Entry to Equilibrium in the
Trading of Nasdaq Stocks, 57 J. FIN. 2289 (2002).
56 See Macey & Kanda, supra note 19, at 1012-13 (noting that liquidity refers
to the ability of traders to buy or sell quickly at a price connected to available
information in the market).
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number of qualified traders to their floor. The more traders an
exchange can attract, the more easily these actors can con-
clude bargains and transact in information. For an exchange,
more business should also mean more profit. A solid profit
margin should enable exchanges to reduce fees and to use
these lower charges to attract even more traders to the floor,
fueling this growth cycle further.57
Finance scholars have long recognized the significance of
these network effects for anchoring the economic functions of
the exchange.5 First, as Professor Ananth Madhavan ob-
serves, network effects help exchanges become better at what
they are supposed to do: match buyers and sellers of securities
quickly and cheaply. An exchange that is home to more traders
will likely find it easier to fulfill this core purpose. Exchanges
with a larger volume of users are likely to showcase richer
liquidity-the ability of traders to enter and exit an investment
rapidly and cost-effectively.5 9
The promise of liquidity should attract expert traders who
can help markets become even more effective at their job. Ex-
changes promising a steady volume of investors should appeal
to expert dealers-firms that use their own money to buy and
sell securities rather than just brokering deals for others.60
Dealers make markets more liquid by offering a ready, reliable
counterparty for investors and for smoothing out the vagaries
of demand and supply.6 1 For these dealers, liquid markets
represent a lucrative source of profit. By taking a slice of gain
from the difference between the prices to buy and sell Public
Company's securities (the "spread"), dealers make reliable
gains by intermediating trades during the day. Dealers and
exchanges can, in fact, mutually benefit from each other. Ex-
changes win if they can host dealers willing to maintain the
smooth flow of trades and to prevent spikes and crashes in
demand and supply. In turn, dealers gain if they can transact
57 See Mark Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Eco-
nomic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REv. 479 (1998) (describing network effects and their
increasing analytical significance in judicial decision-making).
58 For a summary, see Madhavan, supra note 22, at 23-24.
59 The definition of liquidity in finance is notoriously problematic and com-
plex. See Macey & Kanda, supra note 19, at 1012-14; Bengt Holmstr~m & Jean
Tirole, Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring, 101 J. POL. ECON. 678 (1993)
(noting the significance of higher liquidity in securities markets for scrutinizing
public companies).
60 Amihud & Mendelson, supra note 55; Demsetz, supra note 20, at 33 (on
the significance of intermediation).
61 See, e.g., Madhavan, supra note 22, at 212-13; Douglas J. Elliott, Market
Liquidity: A Primer, BROOKINGS INSr., 1, 3-4 (2015).
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on busy venues, capturing steady profits from the liquidity
available on major venues.
6 2
Secondly, deep liquidity can enhance the appeal of markets
to a broad and diverse mix of the investor community. Rather
than just bringing the toughest, most-resourced investors onto
the floor, liquid, reasonably priced markets should encourage a
wider cross-section of investors to enter the arena. As Profes-
sors Gilson and Kraakman observe, markets work most effi-
ciently when they attract a variety of viewpoints and levels of
information from expert, informed investors as well as those
that may be less informed.
63
Network effects can be beneficial for market quality and
exchange performance. As Professor Madhavan notes, if a
market includes more traders, then its fraction of informed
traders as a proportion of the overall number of traders should
fall. 64 This is because, proportionately, a small set of informed
traders will operate in a market comprised largely of unin-
formed actors. As Madhavan posits, this dynamic is a positive
for the market. It provides an incentive to informed traders to
enter, knowing they will win against lesser-informed actors.
6 5
Dealers too should be more active. They can profit from unin-
formed traders and will have an incentive to provide liquidity
more willingly.
66
Information Gains: Network effects also help make markets
better at lowering the costs of acquiring and disseminating
information. Fewer information costs should encourage invest-
ment and reduce discounting.
First, a large cohort of economically diverse, heterogeneous
traders-led by informed investors-should help make mar-
62 Hendrik Bessembinder, Jia Hao & Michael Lemmon, Why Designate Mar-
ket Makers? Afftrmative Obligations and Market Quality (2011) (unpublished man-
uscript), https: //papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=989061 Ihttps:/
/perma.cc/KFQ7-TPQ5]; Stanislav Dolgopolov, Regulating Merchants of Liquidity:
Market Making from Crowded Floors to High-Frequency Trading, 18 U. PA. J. Bus.
L. 651 (2016); New York Stock Exchange, Designated Market Makers, https://
www.nyse. com/publicdocs/nyse/listing/fact-sheetdmm.pdf fhttps://perma
.cc/FZN8-JHKJ] (last visited Apr. 15, 2019). The Nasdaq operates as an exchange
comprising dealers that are each responsible for maintaining a market in specific
securities that are listed on the Nasdaq. On the Nasdaq dealer system, see Ellis,
Michaely & O'Hara, supra note 55.
63 Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 50. For further discussion,
see generally Yadav, Liability, supra note 34.
64 Madhavan, supra note 22, at 23-24.
65 IdL
66 Lawrence R. Glosten, Insider Trading, Liquidity, and the Role of the Monopo-
list Specialist, 62 J. Bus. 211 (1989) (a seminal article articulating that market
makers transact as uninformed traders and lose money to informed actors).
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kets more efficient at reflecting a swathe of information. In the
now classic account, theory holds that markets are efficient
when they reflect publicly available information in the prices at
which securities trade.67 By this account, new information on
a security changes its price. The faster prices adapt to reflect
emerging information on a company's securities, the better a
market's overall efficiency.68 Prices can offer investors easily
understood, low-cost insights into what the market believes a
security is worth-its fundamental value. By aggregating the
store of public information into an indicator of present worth,
the price should include insights about a company's true
value.6 9 While inexact-as prices only reflect current informa-
tion-they can still offer an approximate measure of a com-
pany's real worth.
70
Exchanges that introduce a swath of actors into the price
formation process can help enhance informational efficiency
and capital allocation. Deep liquidity, an active cohort of mar-
ket makers, as well as a familiar trading environment, can
incentivize the interaction of informed and other traders.
7 1
This interplay should generate a more exact price, reflecting
the information that these diverse traders bring to the floor. In
turn, a richly informed market can facilitate capital
allocation.
72
67 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empiri-
cal Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) ("A market in which prices always 'fully
reflect' available information is called 'efficient.'"). The literature in this area is
vast. The efficient capital markets hypothesis has proven controversial, for exam-
ple, by those that lament its lack of explanation of irrational human behavior as
an aspect of the price formation process. See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT
MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE (2000); Lawrence H. Summers,
Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591
(1986). In the legal literature see, for example, Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of
Market Inefficiency: Introduction to the New FInance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003).
68 Recent literature has focused on the use of high-speed algorithms as driv-
ers of increasing efficiency, showing that these can help bring information to the
markets more quickly. See, for example, Jonathan Brogaard, Terence Hender-
shott & Ryan Riordan, High Frequency Trading and Price Discovery (European
Central Bank, Working Paper No. 1602, 2013). For discussion, see generally
Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets,
68 VAND. L. REV. 1607 (2015) [hereinafter Yadav, Algorithmic Trading] (suggesting
that algorithmic trading increases information efficiency in the short term but
may undermine long-term capital allocative efficiency).
69 See sources cited supra note 39 (describing the essential role of informa-
tion professionals in price formation and securities regulation).
70 Gilson & Kraakman, Information Costs, supra note 50.
71 Gilson & Kraakman, Mechanisms, supra note 50, at 554, 565-80.
72 Legal scholarship has developed an extensive literature on the role of
mandatory disclosure for price formation, better share prices, and capital alloca-
tion. A review of this literature is largely outside of the scope of this Article. See,
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Indeed, the ability of exchanges to generate prices effi-
ciently has become a hallmark of their function. Exchanges
have long invested in building systems needed to disseminate
prices widely and promptly across their venue, through such
innovations as the telegraph and the "ticker."73 By circulating
prices to all traders within their venues, exchanges are able to
"produce" a viable market for financial products,74 connecting
price formation to capital allocation in the marketplace.
75
C. The Significance of Exchange Oversight
Given their role in bringing traders together and with prox-
imity to the information they generate, exchanges are ideally
placed to regulate, monitor, and discipline markets. Public
regulators have long recognized the powerful potential of ex-
changes to exercise oversight.76 Exchanges directly intermedi-
ate securities trades, giving them first sight of market
activity.77 Importantly, their network effects mean that traders
prize access to the exchange floor.78 The threat of exclusion,
sanction, or rebuke from an exchange should represent a
strong source of discipline for traders and issuers seeking entry
into the market.
notably, John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a
Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 720-30 (1984); Merritt B. Fox et
al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102
MICH. L. REv. 331, 339-41 (2003). For a critical perspective on the need for a
mandatory disclosure regime, see generally HOMER KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPO-
RATE DISCLOSURE: REGUIATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979).
73 The Ticker displays prevailing buy and sell quotes in a particular security.
The Ticker relied on the development of wire and telegraph technology to dissemi-
nate quotes widely geographically in the marketplace. More recently, exchanges
have been investing heavily in developing technologies to disseminate quotes and
prices as quickly as possible using such innovations as microwave technology to
communicate with traders in increments measured in milliseconds. For discus-
sion, see Yadav, Insider Trading, supra note 3, at 992-98. On the Ticker, see
sources cited infra note 162.
74 J. Harold Mulherin, Jeffrey M. Netter & James A. Overdahl, Prices as
Property: The Organization of Exchanges from a Transaction Costs Perspective, 34
J.L. & ECON. 591 (1991) (noting that exchanges use prices as a mechanism to
produce markets); see also Kenneth D. Garbade & William L. Silber, Technology,
Communication and the Performance of Financial Markets: 1840-1975, 33 J. FN.
819 (1978); Macey & Kanda, supra note 19.
75 In the early days of the NYSE, the NYSE attempted to contractually restrict
the ability of quotes and prices generated on the NYSE to be utilized by outside
trading venues. Mulherin, Netter & Overdahl, supra note 74, at 605-11 (discuss-
ing extensive litigation in the early history of the NYSE and the definition of
NYSE's property rights in the information that it generates).
76 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4; Macey & Kanda, supra note 19.
77 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4, at 1246-52.
78 Id.
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Regulators rely on exchanges to set standards for behavior
on their own trading venues as well as to assist in the enforce-
ment of securities laws on the books.79 Section 6 of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Act requires an exchange to ensure that its
users comply with the exchange's own rules as well as with
applicable laws and standards, including those governing
fraud and manipulation.8 0 Exchanges play an essential role in
the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)-the stat-
ute enacted in the wake of high-profile corporate governance
scandals in the 2000s, that mandates thoroughgoing checks of
a public company's internal corporate controls.8 1 Exchanges
verify that companies seeking to go public can demonstrate
compliance with core SOX provisions in relation to board com-
position, director independence, and oversight committees,
before they can list.8 2 In this way, regulators harness the im-
portance of exchange services for issuer companies as well as
traders-and the high costs of being excluded from them-as a
way to produce good behavior.
On paper, exchanges possess strong incentives to exercise
high quality oversight. As Professors Paul G. Mahoney and
Adam C. Pritchard write, exchanges should be motivated to
craft rules that are tough enough to attract top-listed compa-
nies, trading firms, and market participants.83 Otherwise, an
exchange will fail on account of hosting poor-quality market
participants. Scholars have diverged on exactly how much au-
79 See sources cited supra note 3.
80 See sources cited supra note 3.
81 Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) has
been the source of considerable academic debate as to its real benefits for public
companies, the usefulness of SOX's disclosure and reporting standards, and key
provisions like SOX, section 404. This Article does not seek to enter these de-
bates. The literature on these questions is rich and expansive. For an excellent
review and discussion, see generally John C. Coates & Suraj Srinivasan, SOX
After Ten Years: A Multidisciplinary Review (Harvard Law & Econ. Discussion
Paper No. 758, 2014) (noting inconclusive welfare effects). For a more general
survey on corporate governance and reporting rulemaking, see generally Chris-
tian Leuz & Peter Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting and
Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research, 52 J. AC-
COUNTING RES. 525 (2016) (noting convergence in corporate governance standards,
notably in relation to financial reporting).
82 See, e.g., NYSE LISTING HANDBOOK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS: COR-
PORATE RESPONSIBILITY § 303A.00, http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/Plat-
formViewer.asp?selectednode=chp-12&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-
sections%2F [https: //perma.cc/2BRS-TAAN].
83 Mahoney, supra note 19, at 1457-59; Adam C. Pritchard, Markets as
Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud
Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925 (1999) (observing the benefits of exchange regulation
for securities fraud enforcement); see also Brummer, supra note 4 (analyzing
exchanges as "sellers" of law).
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thority exchanges ought to be accorded, as between public and
private regulators.84 While Professors Mahoney and Pritchard
have advocated for greater delegation of authority to ex-
changes, others like Professor Marcel Kahan have urged cau-
tion in view of the conflicts of interests discussed below.
85
Scholarly disagreement on how much power exchanges should
have is unavoidable. However, the idea that exchanges ought
to develop rules for monitoring and discipline has gone largely
uncontested. As scholars tracing their history have remarked,
exchange rules have been regulating markets long before pub-
lic regulators formally took up the task.8 6 In return, exchanges
have come to enjoy an expansive legal immunity from investor
lawsuits in the performance of their oversight functions.
87
This section highlights key areas of regulatory power held
by exchanges over traders and issuers: (i) listing rules for pub-
lic companies; and (ii) rules governing the conduct of traders on
the exchange.8
Listing Rules: Exchanges stipulate an extensive set of rules
and conditions for companies that wish to publicly list their
securities on their venue. This gatekeeping function assures
investors that companies coming to the marketplace for capital
can fulfill a base standard of organizational viability and com-
petence.8 9 Listing standards span the full panoply of a com-
pany's organization, its business, financial health, and its on-
going activities and events. The NYSE Listings Handbook, set-
ting out the NYSE's eligibility conditions for listing, requires
any public company to satisfy specific corporate governance
and financial conditions and to offer extensive disclosure with
respect to earnings, market capitalization, board composition,
and key personnel.90 The NYSE wants its public companies to
detail how their organization internally handles confidential
information, for instance. Such information is useful to the
84 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4 (for a survey of approaches in different
jurisdictions including the United States).
85 Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regu-
lation, 83 VA. L. REV. 1509 (1997).
86 See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 19, at 1459-62; Mulherin, Netter &
Overdahl, supra note 74, at 605-20.
87 See supra notes 1, 4, 5.
88 For example, exchanges are also regulated by the Financial Industry Regu-
latory Authority, or FINRA, a self-regulatory organization formed by broker deal-
ers to regulate and supervise the industry. About Finra, FINRA, http://www.finra
.org/about [https://perma.cc/HBP8-3EX9].
89 See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 19, at 1461-62.
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exchange to decide whether corporate personnel might have
engaged in insider trading in relation to key announcements.9 1
Public companies must keep the exchange informed of major
events and to correct misinformation in the market.92 Updat-
ing assists the exchange to fulfill market surveillance. For ex-
ample, if a company faces a rumor such as possible
bankruptcy, its stock might crash in price and cause a larger
shock across the market. In such scenarios, an exchange
might be expected to take steps to prevent a spiraling crisis
from causing disruption to other issuers and traders.
93
For investors giving money to a public company in the
expectation of future returns, such vetting represents an enor-
mous benefit. Rather than make investors review corporate
and financial disclosures for conformity with accepted stan-
dards, exchanges can do so instead. Moreover, the oversight
exercised by the exchange to enforce securities and corporate
governance standards can help standardize the internal com-
position and conduct of public companies. This can make it
easier to understand the information that companies
produce.
94
The significance of this scrutiny becomes readily apparent
in cases when the exchange enforces its rules. Exchanges can
"de-list" the securities of a public company such that hese can
no longer be traded on the venue.95 Sometimes, a delisting can
happen by choice and prior agreement between the company
and exchange (for example because of a merger).96 But it can
91 Exchanges are required by statute to facilitate detection and enforcement
of the prohibition against insider trading. See sources cited supra note 4.
92 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4, at 1247; Pritchard, supra note 83, at
1008-11.
93 NYSE, NYSE LISTING HANDBOOK, http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/
PlatformViewer. asp?selectednode=chp 1_2&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2F
lcm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/33H2-5577]; see also NASDAQ, INITIAL LISTING
GUIDE (2019), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/assets/initialguide.pdf [https://
perma.cc/UD2L-529N].
94 Jonathan R. Macey, Maureen O'Hara & David Pompiho, Down and Out in
the Stock Market: The Law and Economics of the Delisting Process, 51 J.L. & ECON
683, 686-87 (2008) (analyzing the workings of the delisting process).
95 See, e.g., NYSE, MKT CONTINUED LISTING STANDARDS, https://www.nyse
.com/ publicdocs/nyse/markets/ nyse-american/
MKT -ContinuedListingStandards.pdf [https: //perma.cc/M4B2-KH9N].
96 The steps for a merger-related delisting may be initiated by the exchange or
by the company undergoing amerger, to start with using Form 25. See, e.g., NYSE
LISTING HANDBOOK, PROCEDURE FOR DELISTING § 804.00, http://nysemanual.nyse
.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp 12&manual=%2F
lcm% 2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F [https://perma.cc/FU3U-PYC6]. For dis-
cussion, see generally W. Andrew Jack & Keir D. Gumbs, Going Dark from a Deal
INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Feb. 2007, at 11.
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also occur involuntarily, such as when a company falls foul of
the threshold conditions the exchange sets for listing.9 7 Ana-
lyzing the approximately 9,000 companies delisted by the
NYSE, Nasdaq and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) between
1995 and 2005, Professors Macey, O'Hara, and Pompilio con-
cluded that almost half of all delistings were involuntary.
These occurred for a number of reasons, for example, if the
company entered bankruptcy, or if it failed to maintain a mini-
mum asset-value or market capitalization.98 Exchanges can
also discipline or delist a firm if it cannot meet corporate gov-
ernance standards, if trading certain securities is not in the
public interest or when the exchange deems a company to be
unsuitable for listing.99
Empirical studies examining the delisting and exchange
disciplinary process for listed companies consistently affirm its
financial and expressive importance.10 0 In their study on
NYSE delistings, Macey, O'Hara, and Pompilio noted that firms
that underwent the procedure suffered dramatic, significant
costs.10 1 Share prices fell by 50% and volatility doubled. Simi-
larly, an examination of Nasdaq listings showed that delisted
companies saw a 50% fall in share price, a tripling of the
spread, and a sharp decrease in trading volume.10 2 These
costs might partially reflect the impact of reduced liquidity off-
97 Macey, O'Hara & Pompilio, supra note 94, at 689-90.
98 See, e.g., Alex Longley, NYSE Is Delisting National Bank of Greece After 91%
Plunge, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-11-27/nyse-is-delisting-national-bank-of-greece-after-9 1 plunge [https: / /
perma.cc/QG87-TZJL; Nina Mehta, AMR Delisted from NYSE a Month After Bank-
ruptcy Filing, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 29, 2011), (noting the delisting of American Air-
lines following the filing of its Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition) https://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-12-29/amr-delisted-from-nyse-a-month-
after-bankruptcy-filing- 1- [https: //perma.cc/DUM7-D3BY].




100 For example, following allegations of insider trading and the resignation of
its auditor KPMG, Herbalife-the nutrition supplement company-was forced to
deny suggestions that it could lose its listing on the NYSE. Steven Russolillo,
Herbalife Doesn't Expect NYSE Delisting After KPMG Resignation, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
9, 2013), https://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2013/04/09/herbalife-doesnt-ex-
pect-nyse-delisting-after-kpmg-resignation [https: //perma.cc/CDF9-DY6X],
NYSE, NON-COMPLIANT ISSuERS, https://www.nyse.com/regulation/noncompliant-
issuers [https: //perma.cc/3EEX-ZRC4].
101 Macey, O'Hara & Pompillo, supra note 94, at 686-87.
102 Venkatesh Panchapagesan & Ingrid Werner, From Pink Slips to Pink
Sheets: Market Quality Around Delisting from Nasdaq (EFA 2004 Maastricht Meet-
ings, Working Paper No. 4572, 2004), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=565325 [https: //perma.cc/775C-7PWC].
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exchange and the higher risks associated with a newly delisted
company. However, exchange oversight clearly matters. In a
study on the impact of corporate governance deficiency notices
issued by the Nasdaq to delinquent companies, Professors
Carol A. Frost, Joshua Racca, and Mary Stanford noted a "sig-
nificantly negative" market response to the news that a com-
pany had received a notice.10 3 The authors found that most
companies receiving a notice eventually remedied their behav-
ior and returned to compliance. The negative market response,
however, suggested that investors were paying attention to the
signaling value of the exchange's enforcement efforts. 104
Policing Traders: In addition to scrutinizing the behavior of
listed companies, exchanges also stipulate rules-of-the-road
for traders wishing to transact on the venue. Rather than allow
any interested investor to enter the marketplace, exchanges
restrict entry to qualified persons able to satisfy set specific
eligibility criteria pertaining to such factors as financials, em-
ployee qualifications, books and records, and firm capital. 10 5
In addition, traders must subscribe to rules of good behavior
once on the trading floor. Conduct rules are designed to safe-
guard the market against the risks of traders committing
abuses like fraud, manipulation, or misusing confidential in-
103 Carol A. Frost, Joshua Racca & Mary Stanford, Shareholder Wealth Effects
of Corporate Governance Deficiencies on Nasdaq 3 (Mar. 27, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https: //papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2515595
[https://perma.cc/SND8-HZBG]; see also Gary Sanger & James D. Peterson, An
Empirical Analysis of Common Stock Delistings, 25 J. FIN. & QUANITATIVE ANALYSIS
261 (1990) (noting price declines after delisting announcements).
104 In one international study examining the impact of exchange regulation on
firm performance, scholars studied listings on the London Stock Exchange (LSE),
which imposes strict governance conditions, and what happens when these list-
ings move to the expressly more lightly regulated Alternative Investment Market
(AIM). See generally Tim Jenkinson & Tarun Ramadorai, Does One Size Fit All?
The Consequences of Switching Markets with Different Regulatory Standards
(ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 212, 2008). Scholars noted that companies
that moved from the LSE to the AIM see a 5% fall in share price on the announce-
ment. Id. at 19. Smaller companies, however, reverse these losses, suggesting
that the lighter regulation may be beneficial for some companies. Id- at 26-27.
For more discussion, see generally id.
105 See, e.g., NYSE, EQUITIES RuLEs, http://wallstreet.cch.com/MKTtools/Plat
formViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp-l_5&manual=/MKT/rules/mkt-rules/. It is
worth noting that exchanges can sometimes offer "direct market access" to some
investors. Rather than become members of an exchange, investors can use a
member's ID to access an exchange floor, subject to supervision by an exchange
member. NYSE, EQuInEs, SPECS AND CONNECTIVITY OPTIONS, https://www.nyse
.com/connectivity/specs [https: //perma.cc/92HF-RKQD].
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formation garnered on account of access to the exchange.10 6
Under the Securities and Exchange Act, national exchanges
have considerable power to discipline members that fail to fol-
low applicable laws and exchange rules, ranging from simple
rebukes to outright exclusion from the venue. 1
0 7
This reliance on exchange oversight makes a great deal of
sense. Exchanges harbor close informational and transac-
tional ties to their traders, with experience and expertise in
understanding how traders behave.10 8 Moreover, exchanges
occupy a front-row seat on the latest action happening on the
trading floor. 10 9 Critically, exchange discipline should have
real bite. Punishment by an exchange, encompassing fines,
public rebukes, formal warnings, and ultimately exclusion car-
ries stigma as well as the real economic cost of traders losing
the ability to easily buy and sell securities.110 Importantly,
exchange oversight saves investors-as well as taxpayers-the
time, money, and effort of performing this task by themselves.
Rather than spending a portion of their capital in investigating
and disciplining traders or listed companies, investors can rely
on exchanges to do this work instead. With expertise, informa-
tion, and disciplinary power, exchanges should be able to do a
more efficient job of this task than individual investors. And by
relying on exchanges for oversight, investors do not have to
discount the capital they put into the market. Public regula-
tors benefit too. By monitoring and enforcing securities rules,
exchanges can reduce the resource burden on the public purse
and increase the intensity of discipline directed at the market.
With exchanges made part of the regulatory apparatus, public
authorities can co-opt for-profit private venues into safeguard-
106 See, e.g., NYSE ARCA, EQUITIES RULES: CONDucT RULES, http://nysearca
rules.nyse.com/PCXtools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp1_-1&manu
al=/PCX/pcxe/pcxe-rules/ [https: //perma.cc/LN8B-DB851.
107 Exchange Act § 6(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(7) (2012).
1O8 For discussion, see Yadav, Liability, supra note 34. On rapid price syn-
chronicity in automated markets, see generally Gerig, supra note 35. On market
automation more broadly and the role of high-speed algorithms in everyday trad-
ing, see generally Brogaard, Hendershott & Riordan, supra note 68; Alain
Chaboud, Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson & Clara Vega, Rise of the Ma-
chines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market, 69 J. FIN. 2045
(2014). On the volatility and riskiness of high-speed, automated markets, see
Robert Jarrow & Phillip Protter, A Dysjunctional Role of High Frequency Trading in
Electronic Markets 3-6 (Johnson Sch. Research Paper Series, No. 08-2011, 2011),
https: / /www.worldscientiflc.com/doi/pdf/ 10.1 142/S0219024912500227
Ihttps: //perma.cc/7CEE-22UA].
109 SEC Regulation Systems, Compliance and Integrity (Reg. SCI), 17 C.F.R.
§§ 240, 242, 249 (2015).
10 0 See, e.g., Mahoney, supra note 19.
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ing trading, rather than leaving them to engage in risky behav-
ior along with the rest of the market.
Indeed, the power of exchange oversight is also revealed by
the cases where exchanges appear to have fallen short in dis-
charging their responsibilities. For instance, the Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange (CME)-a leading marketplace for trading
derivatives-was widely criticized for its failure to supervise the
infamous brokerage firm, MF Global. In that case, an appar-
ently insufficient examination by the CME of MF Global's sys-
tems for managing client money failed to catch intermingling
between MF Global's own funds and those of its clients. After
losing a $6.3 billion on a bet in the market, MF Global declared
bankruptcy, jeopardizing around $1.6 billion of co-mingled cli-
ent money. 111
In May 2010, the CME was again under scrutiny for seem-
ing laxness in disciplining a trader that appeared to have been
engaged in deliberately deceiving markets-entering a series of
fake orders with the intent of altering securities prices. Accord-
ing to a complaint by the CFTC and the Justice Department,
this single trader impacted the market powerfully enough to
precipitate an almost 1,000-point drop in the Dow Jones Index.
The trader was known to the CME because of prior bad deal-
ings. Although the exchange had warned him repeatedly for
his conduct, it had failed to take further action to exclude him
from the venue. In that case, trouble on the CME rapidly cas-
caded across various other exchanges and venues resulting in
a system-wide crisis, now known as the Flash Crash.112
111 Gregory Meyer & Hal Weitzman, MF Global's Fall Puts Spotlight on CME
Group, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2011. Matthew Leising & Donal Griffin, Corzine's Lack
of MF Global Controls Exposed With Missing Cash, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 2, 2011),
https: //www.bloomberg. com/news/articles/2011-11-02/corzine-s-lack-of-mf-
global- controls-exposed-with- missing-customer-money [https://perma.cc/
M49X-S239]. For analysis, see Rena S. Miller, The MF Global Bankruptcy, Missing
Customer Funds, and Proposals for Reforr, Congressional Research Service Re-
port 7-5700 (Aug. 1, 2013).
112 For detail, see United States v. Sarao, Criminal Complaint N.D.Ill..., Case
Number 15 CR 75., Feb. 11, 2015. For comment, see John Cassidy, The Day
Trader and the Flash Crash: Unanswered Questions, NEW YORKER, Apr. 23, 2015.
For a report disputing this account by the Justice Department and the CFTC, see
Eric M. Aldrich, Joseph Grundfest & Gregory Laughlin, The Flash Crash: A New
Deconstruction 4-7 (Working Paper, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract id=2721922 [https://perma.cc/6HWC-MLXE]. For another
explanation, see Andrei Kirilenko et al., The Flash Crash." High Frequency Trading
in an Electronic Market, 72 J. FIN. 967 (2017) (detailing an alternative story for the
Flash Crash, focusing on a large sell order from a Kansas mutual fund and a
subsequent disappearance of liquidity provided by high frequency traders. http:/
/www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/ @economicanalysis/documents/file/
oce_flashcrash03l4.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VDZ-EQHF]: Craig Pirrong, Did
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Cases like the collapse of MF Global and the near miss
during the Flash Crash illustrate the significance as well as the
costs of poor exchange oversight. Clearly, exchanges face fi-
nancial and reputational pressures to provide good policing, a
fact that has not gone unremarked by the exchanges them-
selves. In its annual disclosure the operators of the NYSE note,
for instance, the need for its organization to devote "significant
resources" to maintain the apparatus of surveillance, investi-
gation, and discipline. 1
1 3
To be sure, oversight by exchanges is far from uncontrover-
sial. Exchanges like the NYSE and Nasdaq are themselves part
of for-profit corporate groups, whose own shares are listed and
traded.114 Numerous scholars have remarked on the deeply
distorted incentives that for-profit exchanges harbor to be good
monitors and disciplinarians.1 15 Traders and listed compa-
nies-even if badly behaved-provide the profits that deliver
dividends to an exchange's own shareholders. Limiting the
business or imposing high costs that drive traders off-exchange
can represent a bad outcome for an exchange's bottom line. As
Professor Kahan observes, exchanges may also be reluctant to
acknowledge that their venues can be a home to misbehaving
traders and thus may think twice before taking action.1 16
These concerns are not merely theoretical. In a prominent re-
buke to the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE)-a
derivatives exchange-the SEC chastised and fined the CBOE
$6 million for failing to discipline a problem trader and for
privileging its own business interests over and above the public
good. In this case, when the problem trader came under SEC
investigation, the CBOE went as far as to help the trader with
drafting its submission to the SEC and additionally failed to
give information on the trader to the regulator. 117 Indeed, the
NYSE's own corporate disclosures openly acknowledge the con-
Spoofing Cause the Flash Crash? Not So Fastl, STREETWISE PROFESSOR (Apr. 22,
2013), http://streetwiseprofessor.com/?p=9331 [https://perma.cc/2CF3-
BRUJI.
113 INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, ANNUAL REPORT 25 (2017), https://ir.theice
.com/~-/media/Files/I/Ice-IR/annual-reports/2017/2017-annual-report.pdf
[https: //perma.cc/5SPW-A4ZT.
114 See, e.g., INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, ANNUAL REPORT 4-9 (2014), https://
ir.theice.com/-/media/Files/I/Ice-IR/annual-reports/2014/ice-annual-report-
2014.pdf [https: //perma.cc/2WAB-Z74J].
115 Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4; Karmel, supra note 4; Pirrong, supra
note 45.
116 Kahan, supra note 85, at 1517-59.
117 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges CBOE
for Regulatory Failures (June 11, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/Press-
Release/Detail/PressRelease/1365171575348 [https://perma.cc/XZ54-KE4W].
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tradiction at the heart of exchange policing between the ex-
change's costly role as regulator and its private need to make a
profit for its own shareholders.1 18
Still, the rationale underpinning this expenditure ulti-
mately rests on ensuring a more efficient environment for capi-
tal allocation. In the absence of exchanges exercising
oversight, investors must bear the burden of protecting them-
selves or require public regulators to absorb higher enforce-
ment costs. Facing systematic, duplicative costs, investors will
be reluctant to place the full value of their capital at risk. In-
stead, they will rationally discount what they invest to reflect
the expenditure they assume in policing companies and trad-
ers.119 Where such discounts are significant and systemati-
cally applied, public companies and capital markets will be
much the poorer for it. Where public regulators pick up the
slack, taxpayer resources must be deployed. If an exchange
represents a more experienced, efficient overseer, taxpayer
funds will be unnecessarily depleted.
II
COMPETITION AND FRAGMENTATION IN MARKET STRUCTURE
Exchanges rely on network benefits to attract trading vol-
ume.120 Logic would suggest that markets are best served
when they consolidate all their trading into one or perhaps a
small number of venues. Consolidation can heighten network
externalities. It can also facilitate greater price efficiency by
promoting stronger, more effective exchange oversight.
But consolidation has serious drawbacks. In particular, it
encourages a monopoly-or an oligopoly-in the provision of
trading services. Exchanges are well placed to extract private
rents from users, for example, by charging investors overly
high fees, using weak infrastructure, or delivering a poor ser-
vice. These risks may be particularly salient if exchanges are
constituted as for-profit institutions, seeking to maximize their
returns from a captive base of investors and listed
companies. 121
U.S. regulatory policy has sought to navigate the tension
between the benefits of consolidation and its risks by using a
two-pronged approach: (i) to force exchanges to compete not
just with one another but also with different types of trading
118 INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 27-28.
119 Damodaran, supra note 42.
120 Madhavan, supra note 22, at 47-48.
121 Madhavan, supra note 22, at 47-48; Karmel, supra note 4, at 164-66.
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centers-nonexchange trading facilities that can also match
buyers and sellers with one another; and (ii) to broadly require
that any investor trading in this system of venues can do so at
the best price. 122 By fostering competition to generate the best
price on the system, regulation seeks to create a national mar-
ket of individual exchanges and trading venues each fighting to
attract business to their floor. 123 They must compete. But
they are also interconnected through strong informational and
transactional linkages that enable investors to pick and choose
where to trade. 1
24
This Part examines the evolution of market structure from
consolidation to its current state of heavy fragmentation. 
125 It
highlights the regulatory objectives driving this transforma-
tion-to encourage competition and to lower transaction
costs-and the real-world realization of these objectives in a
proliferation of trading venues. This Part sets the basis for
questioning how effectively a fragmented market structure can
anchor the kind of exchange oversight envisioned by statute
and policy.
A. The Rationale for Competition
Traditionally, securities would trade on the exchanges on
which they first listed. 126 If a Public Company listed its shares
on the NYSE, any investors wishing to buy and sell them in
secondary trading would generally also have to go to the
NYSE. 127 This arrangement provided a number of benefits to
122 Regulation National Market System Rule 611, Order Protection Rule, 17
C.F.R. § 242.611 (a)(1) (2005) (stating that trading centers cannot execute a trade
at a price that is worse than one displayed at another venue and thus seeking to
prevent "trade throughs" on a venue whose price is worse than one on display at
another venue). Trading centers are defined broadly to include exchanges as well
as ATS. It is worth noting that NMS Rule 611 (b) sets out exemptions to this Rule.
For clarification, see Memorandum from the SEC Division of Trading and Markets
to the SEC Market Structure Advisory Committee (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www
.sec.gov/spotlight/emsac/memo-rule-6 11-regulation-nms.pdf [https://perma
.cc/YAA9-QXUN].
123 See infra subpart III.A.
124 O'Hara & Ye, supra note 13.
125 This Article uses the term "national market" somewhat loosely and non-
technically to reference the collection of exchanges and alternative trading plat-
forms that transact in nationally listed securities. It is acknowledged that Regula-
tion NMS and Regulation ATS use a more technical definition of the National
Market System to emphasize those venues that must report their quotes into the
ticker.
126 For example, NYSE Rule 390 restricted the ability of NYSE members to
trade in NYSE securities off-exchange.
127 For discussion, see Memorandum, supra note 122, at 2-3; Stephen Dia-
mond & Jennifer Kuan, Governance Heterogeneity and Performance at US Stock
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the listing exchange. For a start, an exchange could count on a
steady volume of trades, bringing fees, disseminating informa-
tion, and generating network gains.128 In addition, it also en-
sured the committed participation of market makers on the
venue, to maintain liquidity and to prevent spikes and crashes
in demand and supply.129 For scholars that consider ex-
changes as working most effectively when organized as monop-
olies, this state of affairs promoted a market where trading in
securities concentrated naturally in one place. 130
But consolidation can also be problematic. Knowing they
will see a reliable stream of listings and secondary trading,
exchanges and dealers can extract rents from their position. 131
Exchanges can charge high fees for each transaction. Dealers,
too, can maintain higher spreads than justified. On several
occasions, the NYSE and the Nasdaq acted in ways that either
exhibited or tolerated harmful cartel-like conduct. In a famous
study from the 1990s, Professors William G. Christie and Paul
H. Schultz found that Nasdaq dealers were rounding-up quoted
spreads to the next even-eighths. 132 This pointed to an institu-
tionalized practice of systematic collusion between dealers to
pad spreads upward. Elsewhere, the NYSE was sanctioned for
failing to catch its market makers engaged in an abusive
scheme of front-running client orders.13 3 Market makers,
knowing how their clients were going to trade, used that knowl-
edge to get to the trade first, making the deal more expensive
for the client. The NYSE faced SEC sanction for failing to catch
this wrongdoing between 1999 and 2004.
From an investor-centric perspective, consolidation can
also undermine investor choice. Investors can have varied
Exchanges: Evidence from Regulation NMS 2 (Mar. 15, 2012) (unpublished manu-
script), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2024210 [https:/
/perma.cc/QFA3-PGYN].
128 See Diamond & Kuan, supra note 127, at 8, 12.
129 On the role of market makers, see Bessembinder, Hao & Lemmon, supra
note 62, at 3. On different models of market making and their implications, see
Ellis, Michaely & O'Hara, supra note 55, at 2290. On market making in the swaps
market and the potential for distorted incentives, see Robert B. Thompson, Market
Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets After the Financial
Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REv. 323 (2011).
130 Diamond & Kuan, supra note 127, at 9; Demsetz, supra note 20.
131 See Dutta & Madhavan, supra note 31 (arguing that dealers have incen-
tives to be collusive).
132 Christie & Schultz, supra note 31.
133 Specialists Stumble, ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2005), https://www.economist
.com/finance-and-economics/2005/04/14/specialists-stumble [https://perma
.cc/ED33-LUDJ]; Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges the New York Stock Ex-
change with Failing to Police Specialists (Apr. 12, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2005-53.htm [https: //perma.cc/U8WU-9P8H].
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preferences regarding how they wish to trade, what they wish
to reveal, or how immediately they wish to transact. For exam-
ple, an institutional investor, looking to hide a large block or-
der, might want to transact away from full-public view, or in
smaller, bit-pieces of securities across many exchanges to
avoid being seen. A mandate to transact on just a handful of
exchanges can force a homogenizing model on a diverse group
of traders that fails to fulfill the many strategic goals that inves-
tors invariably have. 1
34
Regulation has sought to find a fix to the problem of high
investor costs through the creation of a National Market Sys-
tem. 13 5 Central to its design is the goal of ensuring that inves-
tors anywhere within the System can get the best price for their
trade. They do not have to trade on the exchange on which the
securities are listed-but rather anywhere within the System
that offers the best displayed price. 136 While much has been
written about the National Market System and its shortcom-
ings, its broad policy objective is simple and laudable: to re-
duce unnecessary transaction costs and to encourage price
efficiencies within the securities market. 1
3 7
The centerpiece of the National Market System-in effect,
its core implementing measure-is the Order Protection
134 See Diamond & Kuan, supra note 127, at 10-11.
135 See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 7, 89 Stat.
97, 111-17 (1975); Regulation NMS-National Market System, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,532 n.300 (June 29, 2005); see also
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, MARKET 2000: AN EXAMINATION OF CURRENT EQUrITY MAR-
KET DEVELOPMENTS 17, 1-3 (1994) [hereinafter MARKET 2000].
136 See Regulation National Market System Rule 611, Order Protection Rule,
17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2005); Regulation NMS-National Market System, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,532 n.300 (June 29, 2005);
see also supra note 122 and accompanying text. For an early elaboration of the
core goals of the NMS in 1975, see the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-
1(a)(1)(c) (2012). For an account of the beginning of the NMS and its structural
goals, see Laura Nyantung Beny, U.S. Secondary Stock Markets: A Survey of
Current Regulatory and Structural Issues and a Reform Proposal to Enhance Com-
petition, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 399, 412-20. It is worth noting that SEC
Commissioner Piwowar has called for a ten-year review of Reg NMS as part of the
Regulatory Flexibility Act, inviting comments on NMS' effectiveness. See Rick
Archer, SEC Member Invites Comments On Regulation NMS Review, LAW 360 (Sept.
16, 2016), https: //www.law360.com/articles/840964/sec-member-invites-com-
ments-on-regulation-nms-review [https: //perma.cc/4BE8-33W5].
137 See Jonathan R. Macey & David D. Haddock, Shirking at the SEC: The
Failure of the National Market System, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 315, 337-44; Norman
S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National
Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 883, 957-58 (1981); MARKET 2000, supra note
134, at 17, 1-3.
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Rule. 138 This Rule prohibits trading centers from executing an
order at a price that is worse than the best available price
within the System. It allows some exceptions-for example, if a
client gives its broker permission to avoid the Rule. But it
prevents exchanges from requiring that all orders "trade
through" the exchange on which the security is listed at prices
that are worse than what is available in the market.139 In
effect, the Rule breaks the once-thick link between a security
and its home exchange and requires market makers and bro-
kers to look across exchanges to find the best displayed price.
To ensure that securities can, in fact, be traded on the most
cost-effective venue, exchanges are required to continuously
supply quotes into a national ticker-the Consolidated Tape. 140
The Tape or Ticker collects quotes from exchanges, aggregates
the data and disseminates the best prices available at a given
time on the national network of exchanges.
B. The Rise of Alternative Trading Venues
Regulatory policy has also sought to solve the problem of
investor choice by encouraging the creation of multiple ex-
changes and alternative trading venues.14 ' There would be
little point to a National Market System-where shares should
trade at the cheapest available price-if it comprised just a
small handful of trading platforms. The national market and
the regulatory goal underlying the Order Protection Rule pre-
suppose the availability of multiple trading venues. Without a
few competing venues, there would be little incentive for domi-
nant exchanges to reduce their prices or to create conditions
that offer varied services to investors. 142
SEC rulemaking has deliberately favored competition as a
policy preference in market design. 14 3 Regulation Alternative
138 Regulation National Market System Rule 600, 17 C.F.R. § 242.600 (2005);
Regulation National Market System Rule 611, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2005).
139 See Xiang Cai, Treading Through Trade-Through A Law and Economics
Analysis of SEC Proposed Regulation NMS 3-7 (Feb. 14, 2005) (unpublished Note),
https: / /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=666962 [https://
perma.cc/5AXU-335N].
140 Overview, CONSOLIDATED TAPE ASS'N, https://www.ctaplan.com/index
[https://perma.cc/8KH7-75S6] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019).
141 See Regulation NMS-National Market System, Exchange Act Release No.
34-51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,532 n.300 (June 29, 2005) (noting the intro-
duction of the "Order Protection Rule" to modernize and strengthen the regulatory
structure of the U.S. equity markets).
142 See id.
143 See id. at 503 (noting that the information sharing will provide a starting
point to promote visibility and competition on the part of market centers and
broker-dealers).
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Trading Systems (Reg ATS) allows venues to trade nationally
listed securities without requiring to be formally authorized as
a Section 6 exchange under the Securities and Exchange
Act. 144 Under Reg ATS, broker-dealers can set up venues to
match buyers and sellers-essentially performing what would
be regarded as an exchange-like function-without requiring to
be authorized as an exchange. 145 This means that broker-deal-
ers can establish private platforms to transact in securities or
build their own communication networks to connect investors
without having to go through an exchange first. 
14 6 Reg ATS
permits broker-dealers to enjoy considerable latitude in their
ability to establish nonexchange trading mechanisms, ex-
panding investor choice and reducing transaction costs. 147
Importantly, ATS have operated within a much lighter reg-
ulatory regime than traditional exchanges. Unlike Section 6
exchanges, subject to extensive obligations to ensure fair (but
exacting) entry onto their venues, continuous price disclosure,
and the duty to ensure market oversight, ATS face a far lighter
regulatory burden. 148
Key Regulatory Characteristics: First, Reg ATS requires
trading platforms to register as an Alternative Trading System
(ATS) with the SEC. 14 9 As part of this process, ATS must pro-
vide disclosure regarding the core terms on which the ATS
144 Regulation ATS-Altemative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)
(2015) (giving an exemption under Securities Exchange Act Rule § 3al-l(a)(2)
from registering as a full exchange under Section 6 of the Securities Exchange
Act).
145 Rule 300(a) of Reg ATS states that an ATS is: "(a) ... any organization,
association, person, group of persons, or system: (1) That constitutes, maintains,
or provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers and
sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to securities the
functions commonly performed by a stock exchange within the meaning of
§ 240.3b-16 of this chapter; and (2) That does not: (i) Set rules governing the
conduct of subscribers other than the conduct of such subscribers' trading on
such organization, association, person, group of persons, or system; or (ii) Disci-
pline subscribers other than by exclusion from trading." Id.
146 O'Hara & Ye, supra note 13, at 1-2 (noting the variety of off-exchange
venues, including electronic communication networks). On larger questions and
trends towards disintermediation, as facilitated by technological innovation, see
Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 977, 1024 (2015).
147 Regulation ATS-Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)
(2015) ("The final rules seek to establish a regulatory framework that makes sense
both for current and future securities markets. This regulatory framework should
encourage market innovation while ensuring basic investor protections . . . In
general, this approach gives securities markets a choice to register as exchanges,
or to register as broker-dealers and comply with Regulation ATS.").
148 See Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2012).
149 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a) (2015).
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intends to operate. ATS can vary widely in type and offer inves-
tors a diverse range of services. For example, the Investors
Exchange (or IEX), made famous by Michael Lewis' Flash Boys
and operating as an ATS until June 2016 when it gained recog-
nition as an exchange, subjects all incoming orders to a 350-
microsecond delay. 150 As outlined by the IEX, its platform is
designed to reduce the systemic advantages enjoyed by high-
frequency traders on national exchanges and allay investor
concerns about losing out to this select cohort of traders. 151
ATS terms of operation are critical to setting regulatory and
investor expectations. In January 2016, the SEC and the At-
torney General for New York fined Barclays for false advertising
in relation to its ATS. Regulators found that Barclays had mis-
represented the terms on which it ran its ATS. Investors be-
lieved that they would be trading on an ATS that did not
include aggressive, high-frequency traders (HTF). Barclays,
however, did seem to allow such HF~s to transact with its
clients, negating a key aspect of the why these investors were
choosing to transact on its dark pool. 1
52
Perhaps unsurprisingly given this scandal, the SEC tight-
ened disclosure requirements for ATS in mid-2018, requiring
venues to be more transparent about the terms of an ATS oper-
150 The IEX is the latest exchange recognized to become a full Section 6 Ex-
change. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, Investors' Exchange, LLC; Notice of Filing of Applica-
tion, as Amended, for Registration as a National Securities Exchange under Section
6 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 34-75925 (Sept. 15, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/34-75925.pdf [https://perma.cc/U758-
YYG2]; Lewis, supra note 37.
L51 Order anticipation strategies might work as follows: If a large order from an
Informed Hedge Fund for Public Company shares enters the NYSE, an HFT might
react to this information by rapidly purchasing shares on the NYSE and other
available shares on the NYSE, BATS, or other exchanges. After purchasing these
shares, the HFT can then resell them to the Informed Hedge Fund at a slightly
higher price. In this way, the Hedge Fund pays a higher price in the presence of
the HFT anticipator. For a discussion of HFT and common trading strategies
including anticipation, see Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra note 68, at 116-19.
On the economic effects of order anticipation by HFTs, see Nicholas H. Hirschey,
Do High-Frequency Traders Anticipate Buying and Selling Pressure 31 (Oct. 8,
2019) (unpublished manuscript) (noting that HFIs consistently anticipate in-
formed orders). On the IEX exchange, see IEX Trading Alert, supra note 10; About
IEX, supra note 10.
152 Keri Geiger & Sam Mamudi, Barclays, Credit Suisse Agree to Dark Pools
Settlements, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2016), https: //www.bloomberg.com/news/arti
cles/2016-01-31 /barclays-credit-suisse-to-pay- 1 54-3-million-in-dark-pool-deals
[https: / /perma.cc/T9DB-SL5D]; William Alden, New York Attorney General Adds




ation, how they handle orders, and any potential conflicts of
interest that may impact investors. 15
3
Second, notwithstanding this recent rulemaking, ATS are
generally subject to much lower transparency and other regu-
latory requirements than regular exchanges. The National
Market System demands that exchanges supply a continuous
flow of buy-and-sell quotes into the Ticker to generate a best
price on the Market.
ATS operate in a quite different regulatory environment. An
ATS that represents less than 5% of trading volume in a pub-
licly listed stock in the national market (referred to here as a
"Common" ATS) does not have to publish its quotes on the
Ticker.' 54 This 5% threshold is not especially exacting. While
an ATS might perhaps end up executing over 5% in any single
security, this is not easy. Moreover, it is not in the interest of
an ATS to cross this 5% threshold and become subject to
higher regulatory and reporting requirements. 1
55
Post-trade public reporting requirements for such ATS are
also subject to delays. Broadly, with respect to post-trade in-
formation regarding NMS stock, the self-regulatory organiza-
tion, FINRA makes aggregate data available to the public with a
minimum delay of two weeks for certain NMS securities and
four weeks in the case of others.156 Within the trading day,
'53 Rule 304 Regulation ATS-Altemative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R.
§ 242.304 (2015). This Rule also subjects submissions to a review by the SEC.
The SEC must declare the submission to be effective. For discussion, see James
R. Bums et al., SEC Adopts New Rules to Enhance Public Disclosure of Information
and Regulatory Oversight of Alternative Trading Systems, WILLKIE FARR & GAL-
LAGHER LLP (July 23, 2018), https://www.willkie.com/-/media/Files/Publica-
tions/2018/07/SECAdoptsNewRules to_%2OEnhancePublicDisclosure of
Information.pdf [https: //perma.cc/646H-ZUYH].
L54 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(3) (2015) (describing requirements for alternative
trading systems).
155 It should be noted that electronic communication networks, or ECNs, ex-
pressly post their quotes to the feed. ECNs are ATS whose design Is based on
posting their current quotes to the market. See, e.g., GARY SHORTER & RENA S.
MILLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43739, DARK POOLS IN EQuITY TRADING: POLICY
CONCERNS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1-2 (2014) (describing ECNs).
156 See Update: Alternative Trading System Transparency Trade Report File
Submission, FINRA (Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.finra.org/industry/ats/update-
alternative-trading-system-transparency-trade-report-file-submission [https://
perma.cc/R66A-W56N]. This update amended old FINRA Rule 4552 that required
ATS to report weekly aggregate stock trading volumes to FINRA. See Trade Report-
ing Frequently Asked Questions, Section 102: Timely Submission of Trade Report
Information, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/trade-reporting-faq#102
[https://perma.cc/A6DQ-AV5E] (last updated Oct. 15, 2018) [hereinafter FAQ,
Section 102]; Proposed Change to Rule 4552, FINRA, http://www.flnra.org/sites/
default/files/RuleFiling/p354143.pdf [https: //perma.cc/4UVP-ERNS].
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ATS send details of concluded trades to FINRA within ten
seconds of execution.1
5 7
ATS thus represent a paradigm shift from traditional ex-
changes: pre-trade, these ATS do not have to display their pre-
trade quotes. And post-trade, information appears in the pub-
lic domain with delays that, while shrinking, are out-of-sync
with modem high-speed, microsecond-driven trading practices
on public exchanges. Because of this more black-box ap-
proach, ATS are colloquially termed "dark pools," venues on
which price transparency is limited. 1
58
Thirdly, ATS carry far lighter responsibilities for monitor-
ing, discipline, and oversight. ATS are not mandated to exer-
cise the level of oversight expected of Section 6 exchanges. 159
For one, ATS are heavily circumscribed in their ability to set
rules for overseeing their venues. Common ATS are not subject
to requirements to establish fair and reasonable access to their
venues, as national exchanges must. This can allow ATS to be
choosier about who can use their venue. ATS oversight can
only apply narrowly to their subscribers' conduct on the venue
itself-and not more broadly. This means that ATS cannot
regulate core institutional features about their subscribers-
like financial resources, employee qualifications, or books and
record keeping. Importantly, ATS can only punish their sub-
scribers by excluding them from the venue, rather than de-
ploying the sliding scale of disciplinary levers usual to
exchanges. With a much weaker mandate (and power) to con-
trol the institutional and behavioral conduct of subscribers,
ATS can enjoy lower regulatory costs.
Informational and Transactional Links: The interplay of the
Order Protection Rule and Regulation ATS transforms the in-
formational and transactional architecture of the marketplace.
The Order Protection Rule requires that investors trade shares
at the best displayed price within the National Market. 160 Reg-
ulation ATS helps expand the range of trading venues available
to investors, giving them enormous choice about where they
wish to trade and what factors are important to them when
they enter the marketplace (e.g., do they wish to trade with
157 FAQ, Section 102, supra note 156.
158 See SHORTER & MILLER, supra note 155, at 1-2. Note that this statement
does not apply to electronic communication networks (ECNs) that post their
quotes to the consolidated feed.
159 Regulation ATS-Altematve Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R § 242.300 (2015).
160 Regulation National Market System Rule 600, 17 C.F.R. § 242.600 (2015);
Regulation National Market System Rule 611, 17 C.F.R. § 242.611 (2015).
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HFTs?). 161 The Order Protection Rule and Regulation ATS have
thus resulted in the creation of a fragmented but operationally
interconnected market.
Information must flow freely and rapidly across the mar-
ket, not just to exchanges but also to ATS. For prices to be
competitive, exchanges must continuously update their quotes
and to transmit them across the market. The Consolidated
Tape (or Ticker) organizes this process of collecting, updating,
and distributing information. 162 Importantly, even if ATS are
not directly supplying fresh quotes to the Ticker, they still need
to receive information to benchmark prices on their venue. If
they charge significantly higher prices than what is available
on public exchanges, then investors will have little motivation
to enter an ATS. Information constitutes a critical resource
that is necessary to assure regulatory compliance with the Or-
der Protection Rule. In turn, it connects venues in the market
to one another.
Markets are also connected to each other through hard
transactional channels. Because of the Order Protection Rule,
trading centers constantly supply quotes to compete on offer-
ing the best price. With many venues available, investors, bro-
kers, and market makers must build responsive links to
exchanges and ATS in order to route their orders to the ex-
change or ATS that promises to give their clients the best price
or specifically desired services. 16 3 In this way, traders and in-
formation can move quickly and fluidly across the network of
exchanges and ATS.
C. The Structural Impact of Competition
Regulation ATS and the Order Protection Rule have trans-
formed the structure of securities markets. Most obviously, the
number of exchanges and exchange-like venues has
mushroomed. By some estimates, the market comprises as
many as fourteen public exchanges and around forty or so
active dark pools. 164
161 Regulation ATS-Alternative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300 (2015).
162 Regulation ATS--Altemative Trading Systems, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a)
(2)(1)-(2); 242.301(b)(5) (2015); Overview, CONSOLIDATED TAPE ASSOCIATION, supra
note 140.
163 See, e.g., Markus K. Brunnermeier & Lasse H. Pedersen, Market Liquidity &
Funding Liquidity, 22 REV. FIN. STuD. 2201, 2202-04 (2009) (noting the ability of
market makers to transact across multiple venues).
164 John McCrank, Dark Markets May Be More Harmful than High-Frequency
Trading, REUTERS (Apr. 6, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dark-mar
kets-analysis/dark-markets-may-be-more-harmful-than-high-frequency-trad
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This proliferation of venues has dramatically impacted the
volume of business that flows to public exchanges. Scholars
report that the NYSE's virtual monopoly in secondary trading
in stock listed on its venue has dwindled since the implementa-
tion of the Order Protection Rule in 2005, falling from 80% to
34% in just three years. 16 5 In their study on equity fragmenta-
tion, Professors O'Hara and Mao Ye observe that more than
50% of all equity volume trades away from its home exchange,
with off-exchange venues (e.g., dark pools) handling 30% of all
equity volume. 166 Some estimates suggest that this figure is
higher, positing that dark pools now account for almost
35%-40% of equity trading volume. 16 7 To appreciate the struc-
tural depth of this fragmentation, it is worth briefly examining
two inquiries: (i) what types of ATS operate in the market?; and
(ii) why do investors wish to trade in dark venues over lit ones?
Types of ATS: Perhaps the distinguishing feature of ATS
lies in their sheer variety. Broadly, ATS can be divided into
three categories. 
1 68
First, some ATS represent communication networks that
connect buyers and sellers with each other. 169 For example, a
Hedge Fund might post its interest to buy 100 shares of Public
Company on an electronic communication network. A Mutual
Fund can respond to that interest by offering to sell these
shares to the Hedge Fund. These communication networks
facilitate customer-to-customer trading, eliminating the mid-
ing-idUSBREA3508V20140406 [https://perma.cc/M3MH-HKSF]. On the rising
number of dark pools, see McCrank, supra note 24. In 2019, the SEC approved
the application of the Long Term Stock Exchange to become a national exchange,
making it the fourteenth such exchange, however, at the time of writing, it has yet
to fully launch its operations. See Theodore Schleifer, America's Newest Stock
Exchange Wants to Fix One of Capitalism's Fundamental Challenges, Vox (May 22,
2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/22/18629621/long-
term- stock-exchange-explainer-capitalism-quarterly-earnings [https://perma
.cc/EL2K-5MBK].
165 Diamond & Kuan, supra note 127, at 2.
166 O'Hara & Ye, supra note 13, at 2-5.
167 See BATS, supra note 15: see also Arash Massoudi & Michael Mackenzie,
Stock Exchanges Seek to Stem the Tide of 'Dark Trading,' FIN. TIMES (Apr. 25,
2013), https: //www.ft.com/content/7a5350ac-adO3-11 e2-b271-000144feabdc0
[https://perma.cc/S886-K82F]. It is interesting that on a day of extreme market
stress (August 24, 2015), dark pool volume fell, with investors moving to ex-
changes where they could better ensure they were able to get their desired trades
done. Sam Mamudi, Dark Pools Were the Losers as U.S. Markets Saw Volume
Spurt, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 24, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-08-24/dark-pools-are-the-losers-as-exchanges-get-huge-volume-from-rout
[https://perma.cc/NX32-V87H]; SIFMA, supra note 21, at 12-16.
168 See Haoxiang Zhu, Do Dark Pools Harm Price Discovery?, 27 REV. FIN. STUD.
747, 749-54 (2014).
169 McCrank, supra note 24.
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dleman and providing investors with a lower-cost option than
on an exchange. If investors are large institutions, and enough
of them participate in the network, using communication net-
works can reduce the fees they usually pay for trading. 
170
Secondly, ATS can facilitate large block trading of shares.
Specialized dark pools can help investors to dispose of sizable
chunks of shares whose trading may reveal too much informa-
tion about strategy-and cause too big a splash in the public
marketplace. 171
Thirdly, dark pools can also provide a venue to match
shares, just as an exchange might. Rather than sending orders
to an exchange, where an investor must pay exchange fees,
brokers can instead send these into a dark pool that offers
special services that a customer likes or lower charges. This
reflects the kind of model adopted by the Barclay's dark pool,
whose terms of service (ostensibly) gave investors an opportu-
nity to avoid predatory high-frequency traders.1 7 2 The IEX
(when it was an ATS) marketed itself as an option where a
mandatory time delay helped equalize the playing field between
HFT and other investors. It is worth noting that orders
processed by dark pools represent, on average, a fairly ordinary
and small number of shares (in one study, 256 shares per
trade)-rather than large blocks that may be better off being
traded off-exchange. 173 Put simply, given these relatively small
orders being traded, investors are choosing to trade in a dark
pool, rather than on a public exchange.
Why Trade Off-Exchange?. At first glance, theory would
predict that investors will choose to trade on a public exchange
and not elsewhere. The benefits generated by networks of
users in terms of high liquidity and low transaction costs
should mean that investors will gravitate toward public ex-
changes and not off-exchange venues.
I70 See Michael J. Barclay, Terrence Hendershott & D. Timothy McCormick,
Electronic Communication Networks & Market Quality 2-5 (Simon Sch. of Bus.
Working Paper No. FR 00-19, 2001), https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract id=257486 [https: //perma.cc/ZS8C-TR6N].
171 See Markus Brunnermeier & Lars Pedersen, Predatory Trading, 60 J. FIN.
1825 (2005) (noting that investors that show how they intend to trade are vulnera-
ble to being picked off by predatory traders).
172 See Geiger & Mamudi, supra note 152; Alden, supra note 152.
173 See Frank Hatheway, Amy Kwan & Hui Zheng, An Empirical Analysis of
Market Segmentation on U.S. Equities Markets 3-5 (Nov. 16, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript), https: / /papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2275101
[https://perma.cc/G75N-ETQQ]. According to SIFMA, the average trade size for
equity ATS is 204. SIFMA, supra note 21, at 18.
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This, however, is not the case in modern markets, or even
historically. Scholars have long puzzled over this conun-
drum-why, despite positive network externalities, do inves-
tors still choose to trade outside of the most deeply networked
venues? One explanation, as Professor Madhavan suggests,
lies in the varied needs and preferences of a heterogeneous
population of investors in U.S. markets with different tolerance
for transaction costs. 1
74
First, noted above, ATS offer anonymity to those that wish
to trade on them. Regulation ATS does not require Common
ATS to publish their pre-trade quotes, and post-trade reporting
is subject to delays. Unlike an exchange, trading within dark
pools occurs within the confines of the venue itself. Subscrib-
ers to the dark pool might garner information about the dark
pool operator itself and its terms of trading. Beyond this
mandatory disclosure, however, regulation has expressly cre-
ated pockets within the market for listed securities to transact
with much lower transparency. 175
This anonymity might suit traders that want to safeguard
the value of their information. The longer their information
remains hidden, the better their chances to make money. This
rationale, for example, appears to explain investor interests in
dark pools that limit the activity of high-frequency traders-
commonly viewed as adept in anticipating and trading ahead of
informed investors. 1
7 6
Anonymity can also explain why traders interested in dis-
posing or acquiring large blocks of shares might move toward
dark pools. Dark pools can facilitate block trading, for example
if traders strategically transact small amounts across several
platforms. Even on just one platform, a skilled broker can
execute the order in a piecemeal way over time to avoid detec-
tion. In this way, ATS can offer a meaningful service by helping
investors to transact in blocks without giving away their inten-
tion and reducing their impact on the market. 177
Anonymity can, of course, also attract bad apples. Some
investors may be incentivized to transact on dark pools be-
cause they will avoid being discovered in their intent to manip-
ulate or deceive others. ATS are subject to a far lower burden
174 Madhavan, supra note 22, at 47-48.
175 See, e.g., Hatheway, Kwan & Zheng, supra note 173, at 3-5 (showing that
dark venues successfully segment the market and attract uninformed order flow).
On ATS disclosure rules, see Reg ATS Rule 304, 17 C.F.R. § 242.304 (2015).
176 See Yadav, Algorithmic Trading, supra note 68, at 1629.
177 See Hatheway, Kwan & Zheng, supra note 173, at 4-6.
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in terms of exercising market oversight than exchanges. Under
Regulation ATS, operators are limited to prescribing rules to
cover behavior that takes place just on their specific venue.
Further, their disciplinary power lies only in exclusion. Within
these parameters, dark pool operators are likely to exercise
discipline only when they absolutely have to do so. If the only
option available to a dark pool operator is exclusion-losing
traders that generate business and fees-the motivation to
monitor bad behavior is likely to be heavily circumscribed.
Secondly, investors may shift their business to dark pools
in order to benefit from lower transaction costs and fees. When
trading on an exchange, investors can enjoy network benefits,
but they also face costs, notably in the form of fees and
spreads. ATS and communication networks can compete ag-
gressively with exchanges on transaction costs because their
regulatory obligations are significantly fewer than those faced
by regular exchanges. 178 And as part of these limited obliga-
tions, dark pools do not have to conform as strictly to the usual
pricing regulations that normally constrain exchanges. 179 As
Professors Ronald W. Masulis, Amy Kwan, and Thomas H.
Mclnish note, greater flexibility in relation to pricing rules
has meaningfully boosted the competitiveness of dark pools
versus exchanges. 18 0 With more traders entering dark pools,
178 For example, the SEC has explored whether to change regulations relating
to tick size and pricing. Regulation National Market System Rule 612, 17 C.F.R.
§ 242.612 (2015). The SEC undertook a pilot to test whether this Rule ought to be
amended. For details of the study that ended in September 2018, see Press
Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Approves Pilot to Assess Tick
Size Impact for Smaller Companies (May 6, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/
pressrelease/2015-82.html [https://perma.cc/QZ83-M8C5]; Press Release, Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, Order Directing the Exchanges and the Fi-
nancial Industry Regulatory Authority to Submit a Tick Size Pilot Plan (June 24,
2014), https: / /www.sec.gov/rules/other/2014/34-72460.pdf [https://perma
.cc/5RKY-7M8M]; Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, State-
ment on the Expiration of the Tick Size Pilot (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.sec
.gov/news/public-statement/tm-dera-expiration-tick-size-pilot [https://perma
.cc/R2NU-LVGXI.
179 See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, As Markets Heat Up, Trading Moves into
Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/O1/
business/as-market-heats-up-trading-slips-into-shadows.html [https://perma
.cc/5HSN-UY2H] (noting that dark pools are generally cheaper).
180 Amy Kwan, Ronald W. Masulis & Thomas H. Mclnish, Trading Rules, Com-
petition for Order Flow and Market Fragmentation, 115 J. FIN. EcON. 330 (2015);
see also Robert P. Bartlett, III & Justin McCrary, Dark Trading at the Midpoint:
Pricing Rules, Order Flow and Price Discovery 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res.,
Working Paper No. 21286, 2015) (noting that subpenny pricing allows queue-
jumping by traders that can damage liquidity on public exchanges).
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ATS can replicate some of the network effects common to
exchanges. I8 '
In summary, regulatory policy-in favoring competition
over consolidation-has rapidly transformed the architecture
of markets. From a handful of dominant trading venues, as
was once the case, equity transactions in the United States are
fragmented across more than fifty exchanges and dark
pools. 182 This focus on competition, however, creates a funda-
mental schism in policy, raising serious questions about
whether exchanges can continue to fulfill their role as private
regulators in the securities markets.
III
THE DECLINING POWER OF EXcHANGE OVERSIGHT
This Part examines the impact of competition and fragmen-
tation on the ability of exchanges to oversee markets. Ex-
changes have long faced skepticism regarding their
institutional capacity to perform this supervisory role. Schol-
ars have questioned whether for-profit institutions can really
properly perform the public service of policing. 183 Consolidated
venues can also deliver poor oversight owing to rent-seeking
incentives. 1
84
This Part shows that fragmentation creates an entirely new
challenge beyond the usual criticisms that exchanges have
faced in the past. Owing to fragmentation and the pressure to
compete alongside lightly regulated platforms, exchanges are
severely weakened logistically and institutionally in their ca-
181 In particular, dark pools have had more latitude in relation to quoting
prices within the penny to offer subpenny price improvements. On the permissi-
bility of subpenny price improvements, see Division of Market Regulation: Re-
sponses to Frequently Asked Questions Concerning Rule 612 (Minimum Pricing
Increment) of Regulation PIMS, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, https://www.sec.gov/divi
sions/marketreg/subpenny6l2faq.htm [http://perma.cc/TS6U-KJ4C].
182 On the question of how this fragmentation impacts market quality see, for
example, Hatheway, Kwan & Zheng, supra note 173, at 3-5; Zhu, supra note 168,
at 749-54; Sabrina Buti, Barbara Rindi & Ingrid M. Werner, Diving into Dark Pools
2-3 (Fisher College of Bus. Working Paper No. 2010-03-010, 2011), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1630499 [https://perma.cc/
GGT8-XCBH] (noting the characteristics of the stock that Is traditionally traded
on dark pools). See also Kwan, Masulis & Mclnish, supra note 180 (noting the
potential for liquidity to be fragmented).
183 See Fleckner & Hopt, supra note 36; Kahan, supra note 85; Karmel, supra
note 4. For a comparison of incentives between mutual, member-owned Incen-
tives and for-profit institutions, see Pirrong, supra note 45.
184 Notably, in the examples heighted earlier, the MF Global and Flash Crash
debacles, allegedly originating on the CME, as well as the CBOE infraction, oc-
curred on consolidated venues for the trading of derivatives.
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pacity to deliver oversight. Further, in an operationally inter-
connected market, competition introduces the risk that
exchanges underinvest in governance because they can inter-
nalize private gains from weak discipline, while externalizing a
part of the costs to other competing exchanges and dark pools.
A. The High Costs of Exchange Oversight
Oversight is expensive. 185 Regulators confront a multitude
of costs. To monitor markets, to detect bad behavior, and to
punish mistake, manipulation, fraud, and disruption, over-
seers must devote significant resources to the task. These in-
clude not just the finances necessary to support the
infrastructure for oversight, but also time, expertise, and
reputational investment to signal quality and commitment to
the task. 186
Statute places express responsibility on exchanges to mon-
itor and discipline those that utilize the exchange for listing
and trading. 18 7 This task is resource intensive for an exchange
seeking to perform it effectively. For a start, exchanges need to
invest in building the systems necessary for detailed monitor-
ing and surveillance.'8 8 Commentators have highlighted the
rising costs of this charge, fueled by exponential growth in
technology and the data-intensity of modem, high-tech, high-
speed markets. 189
185 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014, at
35-43 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secafr2Ol4pdf [https://per
ma.cc/45QW-DSVD]. For discussion on budgetary issues, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Managing the "Expectations Gap" in Investor Protection: the SEC and
the Post-Enron Agenda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1139, 1143 (2003). See also Howell E.
Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Re-
source-Based Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207, 208 (2009) (noting the regulatory
intensity and costs of public-private investment in the U.S.).
186 See AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2014, supra note 185, at 35-43
(noting investment in hi-tech data, economic analyses, and projected technologi-
cal investment).
187 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(1), (b)(6) (2012).
188 See Rule 613 (Consolidated Audit T)-ail), SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www
.sec. gov/divisions/marketreg/rule613-info.htm [https: //perma.cc/89JC-72XT];
Christian T. Brownlees & Giampiero M. Gallo, Financial Econometric Analysis at
Ultra-High Frequency: Data Handling Concerns (UniversitA di Firenze, Diparti-
mento di Statistica G. Parenti, Working Paper No. 2006-3, 2006), https://pa-
pers. ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=886204 [https: //perma.cc/66WK-
6SL2].
189 See CAPGEMINI, TRENDS IN THE GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS INDuSTRY 2012: FINAN-
CIAL INTERMEDIARY FIRMS 8-10 (2013), https://www.capgemini.com/us-en/wpcon-
tent/uploads/ sites/ 4/20 17/08/trends-in-theglobalscapital-markets_2012_fi
nancialintermediary firms_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/79MH-LQJ9]; Brownlees &
Galo, supra note 188, at 15-17.
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In addition to surveillance, exchanges must also invest in
enforcing discipline. This is tricky. As discussed above, ex-
changes face a conflict when called upon to discipline the trad-
ers and companies from which they derive their revenue. As
for-profit firms, dependent on traders and listed companies for
their business, it is easy to see why exchanges would think
twice before taking action to punish paying customers.
Exchanges have sought institutional workarounds to deal
with this conflict. In some cases, they have established sepa-
rate legal entities-distinct from the exchange itself-to carry
out the actual business of punishing violations. The NYSE, for
example, has established NYSE Regulation, a not-for-profit
subsidiary of the NYSE that is charged with leading the ex-
change's enforcement efforts.190 In addition, exchanges have
outsourced-to varying degrees-their oversight responsibili-
ties to the Financial Industry Regulatory Association (FINRA),
the self-regulatory organization for broker-dealers. Instead of
enforcing breaches themselves, exchanges can delegate an al-
location of this task to FINRA. 191 The solution is far from per-
fect-particularly as some observers have noted shortcomings
in FINRA's enforcement intensity. 192 However, it offers a mech-
anism to blunt, in part, the perceived conflict of interests em-
bedded in the notion of exchange oversight.
Fragmentation, however, further increases the costs of
oversight, and diminishes the incentives of exchanges to invest
in it. First, fragmentation raises the per-trade costs of policing,
reducing the financial motivation to perform this task
effectively.
Historically, exchanges have been well placed to recoup the
costs of monitoring and discipline on account of consolidation.
They hosted public listings as well as dominated secondary
trading in listed securities. With exchanges guaranteed to see
190 NYSE, NYSE REGULATION, https://www.nyse.com/regulation [http://per
ma.cc/9UZF-BWUV].
191 See Sheppard Mullin, Forward to the Past: NYSE Returns to Regulation,
GOV'T CONTRACT LAw BLOG (Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.governmentcontractslaw-
blog.com/2015/11 /articles/regulatlons/forward-to-the-past-nyse-retums-to-
regulation/[http://perma.cc/LEF5-JVWE]; John McCrank, Wall Street Watchdog
FNRA to Monitor BATS' Markets, REUTERs (Feb. 6, 2014), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-bats-finra-idUSBREA151ZC20140206 [https: //perma.cc/Y99A-
4HFH]. It is worth highlighting that the NYSE took back its allocation to the
FINRA, such that NYSE Regulation became charged with enforcement, effective
January 1, 2016.
192 See Andrew Tuch, The Self-Regulation of Investment Bankers, 83 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 101, 137-40 (2015) (observing that FINRA's actions against invest-
ment bankers were relatively few).
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listing fees, trading volume, as well as reputational capital,
investment in oversight made sense. Exchanges could privately
reap the benefits. If they performed diligently in this context,
then they could enjoy the fruits of ajob well done. Listed com-
panies would be sounder economic prospects and traders bet-
ter behaved, attracting more investors and public companies to
the venue. 193
These advantages break down in a fragmented market. Ex-
changes see deeply diminished volumes of traders on their
venue, reducing fees and trading business. Both the NYSE and
the Nasdaq have witnessed sharp reductions in their trading
market share. When the NYSE suffered its four-hour outage in
July 2015, the market hardly reacted, with traffic diverted eas-
ily to other exchanges and dark pools. According to one com-
mentator, this absence of panic reflected NYSE's sharply
reduced share of overall equity volume, sometimes hovering
around the 1% mark during the day, with activity only intensi-
fying at the beginning and close of trading. 1
94
Lower market share poses a problem for exchanges. The
cost of their oversight infrastructure must be supported by the
activities of a much smaller reserve of traders. Exchanges
must pay a steady, fixed cost for overseeing the marketplace
through infrastructure and institutional mechanisms built for
the task-as well as ongoing monitoring and discipline. Their
returns from this investment, however, are much lower given
the reduced, uncertain volume of trading business.
Indeed, the returns of oversight are lower in fragmented
markets also because exchanges face higher costs to obtain
information from other venues and to coordinate in monitoring
and discipline. Competition encourages traders to shop for the
best deal. To the extent that traders are strategically choosing
where to trade at any given time, their decision-making in-
creases the information costs that exchanges must bear in
monitoring traffic. Instead of relying on a regular set of repeat
players in a consolidated market, whose habits, behavior, and
strategies can be tracked over time, fragmentation creates a
more fluid set of actors coming to the venue and taking their
business to multiple platforms. Patchy information on a shift-
ing set of traders makes it harder for exchanges to establish
and understand patterns of behavior. To the extent that ex-
193 See Mahoney, supra note 19; Pritchard, supra note 83.
194 Phillip Stafford, Shrinking Trading Floor Does Not Reduce NYSE's Influence,
FIN. TIMES (July 16, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/flec9d8O-2al5-1 le5-86
13-e7aedbb7bdb7 [https://perma.cc/4R6E-T6N4].
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changes see steadily lower volumes and reduced revenues from
trading, the motivation to spend on such analysis will likely
grow less compelling.
Secondly, within a fragmented market, exchanges do not
internalize the full benefits of their investment in oversight.
Rather, competitors reap these gains. Put simply, other ex-
changes and dark pools can free ride off the efforts of a diligent
exchange.
Competitively, exchanges must absorb the lion's share of
the costs of oversight. ATS face light obligations when it comes
to policing. They set rules to regulate the behavior of traders on
their venue and nothing more, and they can only really disci-
pline by excluding users. 195 Moreover, ATS can always rely on
exchanges to police traders and save themselves time and
money in the process.
This profoundly uneven distribution of oversight costs
might appear reasonable at first sight. Theory suggests that
exchanges should see more volume given the strength of their
networks and the attractions of transparency and oversight.
Also, individual dark pools benefit by keeping volumes below
the 5% volume threshold in order to utilize the lighter regula-
tory regime. 196 On this basis, requiring that exchanges carry
the greater regulatory burden makes sense, given that they
should have broader sight of traders and more to lose if some-
thing goes wrong. However, this rationale breaks down in
practice. While individual dark pools may try to keep within
the 5% limit, exchange volumes too routinely fall below or trade
around this limit. 197 Moreover, by requiring exchanges to bear
a higher cost (that they might pass onto their customers), regu-
lation can create incentives for investors to move into cheaper
dark pools.
Thirdly, higher regulatory costs per trade and an uneven
distribution of regulatory costs between ATS and exchanges
deepen the conflicts of interests that have always afflicted ex-
changes. Scholars have long highlighted the basic conflict of
interest underlying exchange oversight.198 Exchanges must
discipline the very traders and companies that represent their
source of revenue, market share, and reputation. As for-profit
institutions, exchanges face a deep tension in satisfying both
195 See discussion supra subparts II.B-C.
196 See supra note 152.
197 See Stafford, supra note 194.
198 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 85; Karmel, supra note 4; Pirrong, supra note
45. For comparative discussion, see Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4.
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their private accountability to their own shareholders and their
public accountability to the market. 199
The pressure created by increased competition and lower
revenues from trading can motivate exchanges to seek out
other sources of profit. Numerous examples showcase at-
tempts by exchanges to bridge closer financial ties between
themselves and their users. For instance, it is commonplace
for exchanges to pay traders that bring liquidity to the venue.
Rather than simply charging a flat fee for transactions, venues
can calibrate fees to reflect the benefit (in the form of liquidity)
any particular trader brings to the platform. Exchanges can
pay a trader to "make" trading opportunities by providing this
liquidity for others and can charge a fee from one that "takes"
them.
To illustrate, Trader A submits an order offering to buy 100
shares of Public Company at $100 a share from anyone that
wishes to sell. Trade A is thus providing liquidity. Trader B
wants to sell and takes up Trader A's offer. Trader B thus takes
liquidity. Instead of charging everyone a flat fee, the exchange
can charge Trader B a fee of 50 cents because she succeeded in
fulfilling her order (taking liquidity). Meanwhile, the exchange
can pay Trader A a rebate of 30 cents for providing this oppor-
tunity (providing liquidity).20 0 Traders that act as counterparty
to others can benefit by receiving a payment from the ex-
change, motivating them to step forward and act as a market
maker. For an exchange, the gains come through recapturing
volume and reputation. More importantly, exchanges make
money from this arrangement. They pocket the difference be-
tween the fees they charge from "takers" and the money they
spend on rebates to pay the "makers" (20 cents, in the above
example). The more volume and investors that exchanges at-
tract, through the promise of traders standing to trade, the
more money the exchange can stand to make.
20 1
Colloquially termed "maker-taker" fees, these arrange-
ments have attracted considerable attention from scholars and
199 See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 85; Karmel, supra note 4; Pirrong, supra note
45. For comparative discussion, see Gadinis & Jackson, supra note 4.
200 This illustration is entirely stylized for ease of describing the phenomenon.
For one, Rule 610 of Regulation NMS caps access fees at 3/ 1Oths of a cent per
share for stocks with prices of $1 or more. It should be noted that ATS such as
electronic communication networks can also set maker-taker fees. For discus-
sion, see Dolgopolov, supra note 28, at 244-45.
201 Thierry Foucault, Ohad Kadan & Eugene Kandel, Liquidity Cycles and
Make/Take Fees in Electronic Markets, 68 J. FIN. 299 (2013) (noting the self-
reinforcing dynamic between liquidity seekers and liquidity suppliers); PATTERSON,
supra note 37, at 40-45.
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policymakers for their impact on market quality.20 2 While
analysis of these larger questions is outside the scope of this
Article, these fees highlight a close mutual dependence be-
tween the economic health of exchanges and high-volume trad-
ers.20 3  In a fragmented, competitive marketplace, this
interdependence heightens existing costs that exchanges face
in enforcing discipline against active, liquidity-supplying trad-
ers. Exchanges lose business; moreover, their competition
gains if this volume moves elsewhere.
Beyond this fee structure, exchanges also offer a suite of
services that now constitute lucrative sources of revenue. Ex-
changes sell data packages, promising more detail and faster
information streams than what is publicly available.20 4 They
sell real estate that secures physical proximity for users to
exchange servers, facilitating speedier trading between the ex-
change and trader.20 5 Tellingly, exchanges even offer advisory
services to users designed to help them comply with obligations
under exchange rules and corporate governance.
Analysts have observed that exchanges have seen their rev-
enues rise despite the noted fall in exchange volume. In 2014,
the NYSE earned $762 million of operating income. Between
2010 and 2015, the key exchange groups (then covering the
BATS exchanges, NYSE, Nasdaq) were reported to have seen a
202 See, e.g., Kara M. Stein, Comm'r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comn'n, Remarks
Before Trader Forum 2014 Equity Trading Summit (Feb. 6, 2014) (noting prob-
lematic aspects of maker-taker fees for investors). For discussion of the contro-
versies surrounding maker-taker fees and a broad discussion regarding its
interface with securities regulation, see Dolgopolov, supra note 28, at 233-37. In
response to the Nasdaq and NYSE challenging the SEC's ability to conduct the
transaction fee pilot program due to the costs it creates for the exchanges, the
SEC announced on March 28, 2019 that the program would be put on hold. See
Order Issuing Stay, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Release No. 34-85447 (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2019/34-85447.pdf [https: //perma.cc/554V-
6LW4].
203 Dolgopolov, supra note 28, at 244-48 (on best execution duty to investors).
204 See, e.g., NASDAQ GLOBAL DATA PRODUCTS, TOTAL VIEW FACT SHEET (2012),
http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/content/ProductsServices/DataProducts/
TotalView/TotalViewProFactSheet.pdf [http://perma.cc/253P-Q9SV]; NASDAQ,
U.S. AND GLOBAL DATA FEEDS, http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/trader.aspx?id=dp
specs [http://perma.cc/9VP4-W94X] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019); NYSE, DATA
PRODUCTS, http://www.nyxdata.com/Data-Products/Real-Tlme-Data [https://
perma.cc/YA7D-M5651.
205 See, e.g., NASDAQ, CO-LOCATION, http://www.nasdaqtrader.com/Trader
.aspx?id=colo Ihttp://perma.cc/KU4F-M932] ("Nasdaq offers all customers the
opportunity to co-locate their servers and equipment within the Nasdaq Data
Center, providing proximity to the speed and liquidity of all of our U.S. markets.")
(last visited Feb. 15, 2019). For discussion on co-location and proprietary data
feeds, see Yadav, Insider Trading, supra note 3.
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rise of 16% in their quarterly revenue, with a 62% growth in the
revenue derived from technology and data services.
20 6
Entrenched commercial relationships between an ex-
change and its users present difficult trade-offs for exchanges
seeking to robustly enforce the rules. The basic conflict of in-
terest remains: profit-seeking exchanges are likely to be wary of
taking action against major customers. However, the costs of
this conflict may be more tolerable when exchanges can count
on continuing, captive volumes of business as part of a consoli-
dated market structure. Fragmentation deepens the conflict of
interest. The exchange must think harder about taking disci-
plinary action against paying members. Enforcement can re-
sult in exchanges losing customers in an environment of falling
volumes. Moreover, these customers can take their business to
a competing platform. In addition, fragmentation encourages
exchanges to seek profits by selling other services, like data
and technology. Robust enforcement can dent these busi-
nesses as well.
B. Information Gaps and Coordination Failure
Fragmented markets mean that exchanges face high costs
in monitoring activity on other trading platforms beyond their
own, including more opaque dark pools. Without this informa-
tion, however, exchanges cannot fully determine the risks on
their own venue and the market.
The National Market System aspires to be an essentially
singular economic space for trading securities.20 7 Through the
Order Protection Rule, the System works to generate a best
price for the market. To make this happen, trading venues are
connected to each other through strong informational as well
as operational links.208 Brokers and dealers should be able to
transact across multiple venues for their clients and attain the
best available price as they do so.
206 Stafford, supra note 194; Larry Tabb, Stock Exchanges are Eating Your
Returns, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/opirnion/arti
cles/2016-01-22/stock-exchanges-data-fees-harm-investors [https://perma.cc/
US8W-UWAP].
207 Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29 § 7, 89 Stat. 97,
111-17; Regulation NMS-National Market System, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,496, 37,532 n.300 (June 29, 2005) ("In 1975, Congress
directed the Commission, through enactment of Section 1 A of the Exchange Act,
to facilitate the establishment of a national market system to link together the
multiple individual markets that trade securities.").
208 Gerig, supra note 35.
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The ability of exchanges to exercise effective oversight faces
a conceptual problem: traders can move easily across the sys-
tem. Exchanges, however, can only really monitor activity on
their own venues effectively. This leaves exchanges facing
blind-spots. Though Section 6 may envision a handful of ex-
changes safeguarding the securities market, fragmentation
leaves exchanges incapable of doing so logistically, as more
trading migrates to dark pools. With dark pools subject to
much lighter regulatory requirements, exchanges face risks
emanating from potentially riskier, less-monitored, and less-
transparent areas of the market.
These blind spots mean that exchanges face (impossibly)
high information and coordination costs in oversight, making it
much harder for exchanges to detect misconduct and enforce
securities rules. For instance, statute requires exchanges to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative behavior. Fulfilling this
mandate is especially difficult where traders can transact
across a variety of venues with different degrees of regulation
and transparency. A fraudster may seek to escape detection by
trading through a dark pool. If she wishes to trade, she can
buy or sell her tainted shares on a dark pool with limited trans-
parency.20 9 If this fraudster also trades on an exchange, it is
difficult for the exchange to track her trading, find out about
her bad activities on the dark pool and to discipline her.
Similarly, a trader intent on manipulating markets may
strategically engage in a kind of "supervisory arbitrage" be-
tween transparent exchanges and opaque dark pools. For in-
stance, she might split her orders between an exchange and a
dark pool. She might submit a series of "sell" orders for Public
Company shares on an exchange, depressing the market price.
Following this, she can go to a dark pool and purchase Public
Company shares at the artificially depressed price without nec-
essarily alerting the exchange or other traders.2 10 Eventually,
the shares of Public Company should return to their "efficient"
price. When that happens, she can sell the shares on the dark
pool at the higher price. Limited pre-trade transparency and
209 Matthew Coupe, Dark Pools Need Clampdown, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 5. 2013),
https://www.ft.com/content/111 cb44-9144-1 le2-b839-00144feabdcO [https:/
/perma.cc/H4BR-NB3L].
210 Recall that dark pools do not contribute to price discovery but utilize the
exchange price to benchmark prices on the dark pool. For a study on manipula-
tive techniques between a crossing network and an exchange, see Mao Ye, Price
Manipulation, Price Discovery and Transaction Costs in the Crossing Network 3-4
(Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign Working Paper, 2012) https://papers.ssrn
.coM/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2024057 [https: //perma.cc/KJS7-4DXD].
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delayed post-trade transparency on the dark pool makes it
harder to connect the dots and determine whether a violation of
exchange rules and securities laws has taken place.
Exchanges have two possible options to monitor the mar-
ket, despite fragmentation. First, they might monitor other ex-
changes and dark pools to overcome information deficits.
Exchanges might seek out information from other venues on
traders, carefully scrutinize post-trade prices, or observe unu-
sual trading on their own platforms that might connect with
information from other venues.
Though appealing, this option is likely too time- and re-
source-consuming to be feasible. Exchanges must investigate
any number of dark pools and other exchanges. The costs of
investigations will be high. Exchanges would have to police
volumes of trading outside of their own venue. With informa-
tion limited as a result of a lack of pre-trade and post-trade
transparency at dark pools, these investigation costs will likely
be too high for any one exchange to wish to internalize
privately.2 1
1
Exchanges could also police individual traders more dili-
gently. Such intensive oversight would rest on the assumption
that exchanges and dark pools are home to a common popula-
tion of traders that are simply moving from one venue to the
next. By controlling the conduct and institutional characteris-
tics of those that come to trade on their venue, exchanges can
create externalities that benefit the system as a whole. By forc-
ing traders to behave better on their exchange, exchanges can
ensure that the market generally becomes a place for safer
traders.
Even here, the solution breaks down. Emerging studies
suggest that the investor populations of dark pools versus lit
exchanges often diverge. Even though informed traders can be
motivated to use dark pools to maximize the secrecy of their
information, studies caution against simply assuming that
dark pools comprise cohorts of informed traders. Interestingly,
informed traders can face a number of problems when trading
in a dark pool. If they are all informed about Public Company's
real value, they may all trade similarly and in one direction.
This group thus needs a variety of traders including unin-
211 The Nasdaq is seeking to develop dark pool surveillance. Smarts Trade
Surveillance for Dark Pools, NASDAQ, https: //business.nasdaq.com/tech/survefl-
lance/ surveillance-solutions/ smarts-dark-pools/index.html [https://perma.cc/
938K-QS8V].
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formed traders against which they can make money.2 12 Dark
pools consisting largely of informed traders are thus unlikely to
do well. The risks of nonexecution or overly expensive execu-
tion will be too high. Moreover, liquidity suppliers (market
makers) will be reluctant to transact on a venue filled with
informed traders. Market makers will predictably lose in such
an environment, as informed traders win consistently.
2 13
Instead, studies suggest that dark pools are, in fact, popu-
lated more heavily by uninformed traders rather than informed
ones. As Professor Haoxiang Zhu observes, dark pools can be
more attractive to uninformed traders. Ironically, as an indi-
rect effect, this means that public exchanges can end up more
informed, because savvy investors are drawn to exchanges ow-
ing to the availability of more reliable execution. Relatedly,
finance theory suggests that market makers will move to ve-
nues with a higher population of uninformed investors in order
to make money. Dark pools, should therefore be attractive to
market makers that benefit by trading against more unin-
formed traders.2
14
This leaves exchanges in a difficult position in their effort
to monitor traders. The population of traders may not always
be constant or common between dark pools and exchanges.
Uninformed traders may congregate more frequently on dark
pools or may be more willing to shift their business to dark
pools from exchanges if this suits a particular strategy (e.g., the
need to trade secretly). It cannot just be assumed that ex-
changes will see a steady and common pool of traders that can
be scrutinized and whose activities can be controlled
effectively.
Furthermore, even if discipline is exercised by an exchange
against a Trader-for example, if an exchange demands that a
Trader keep more capital-this discipline may be insufficiently
demanding to reflect the risk the Trader takes. Without fully
212 See Andr6 Perold, The Implementation ShortfalL Paper Versus Reality, 14 J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT. 4 (1988); Robert Engle & Robert Ferstenberg, Execution Risk
(Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12165, 2006), https://
www.nber.org/papers/wl2165.pdf [https://perma.cc/M87T-Y8KX].
213 Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 20 (noting that dealers transact as unin-
formed traders).
214 This reflects the "cream-skimming" hypothesis, whereby off-exchange mar-
ket-makers "skim off" uninformed traders and make money by trading with these
actors. For an early discussion and comparison between the NYSE/NASD, see
Hendrik Bessembinder & Herbert M. Kaufman, A Cross-Exchange Comparison of
Execution Costs and Information Flow of NYSE-Listed Stocks, 46 J. FIN. ECON. 293,
295-96 (1997) (finding evidence of cream skimming by off-exchange market-mak-
ers of uninformed traders).
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knowing what traders are doing on other venues, exchanges
may inefficiently "price" the risk that the uninformed trader
creates. Even if the uninformed trader keeps more capital to
reflect the risks it takes on the exchange, it may not be keeping
enough capital to reflect risks it also takes on the dark pool and
the exchange. If the uninformed trader is splitting its orders
between an exchange and a dark pool, it can create common
risks and fail to pay for this conduct. If the exchange asks for
better reporting of the trades, it cannot easily verify the veracity
of this information without a robust knowledge of trading on
the various dark pools in operation.
C. Underinvestment in Oversight
Regulation splits oversight responsibilities unevenly be-
tween exchanges and dark pools. Exchanges are subject to
Section 6 of the Exchange Act; dark pools are not.2 15 This
asymmetry places a relatively higher compliance cost on ex-
changes. Because exchanges are subject to this mandate, they
should be motivated to contact other exchanges and dark pools
and to cooperate in the exercise of oversight.
However, this may not necessarily be the case. In the Na-
tional Market, interconnected venues compete for business,
such that venues can gain from taking risks for private gain
because the fuller costs of this risk-taking are borne by and
shared between other venues. Venues stand to benefit by in-
vesting minimum resources in oversight, as the costs of failure
can be externalized to the system of exchanges and dark pools.
For a start, exchanges have little incentive to exceed a min-
imum level of investment, not going beyond what is sufficient to
police users on their own venues. Investing to bridge the gaps
in oversight left by other venues is wasteful from the perspec-
tive of their own profits. By going beyond what the exchange
needs to do to keep its own venue safe, it confers value on its
competitors. Other venues enjoy the benefit of safer traders
and can attract business by the promise of cheaper services
(because they can freeride off a diligent exchange's efforts).
Externalizing such benefits to other venues is harmful to an
exchange. Not only does it allow a competitor venue to free ride
on the exchange's investment, but it can also encourage a com-
petitor to exercise less than optimal oversight on its own venue.
A competitor venue-relying on an exchange to do the hard
work-has every incentive to underinvest in monitoring. Ex-
215 17 C.F.R. § 242.301(b)(3) (2015).
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changes can thus be wary of allocating excess resources to
general oversight. Doing so risks enriching competitors and
encourages these competitors to take more risks, knowing that
hard-working exchanges are picking up the tab.
But do exchanges have incentives to do even less than the
minimum desirable to secure their institution? On the one
hand, it is clear that exchanges and dark pools face costly
consequences when they fail in the exercise of good govern-
ance. The SEC fimed the Chicago Board Options Exchange for
falling short in the performance of its duties as a market regu-
lator.2 16 The CME faced enormous reputational damage fol-
lowing its failure to catch the mismanagement of client money
at MF Global. And, the various glitches and malfunctions af-
flicting exchanges-like the Nasdaq and NYSE outages-have
cast doubt on their robustness to offer a credible platform on
which to transact.
However, interconnection and fragmentation can create in-
centives toward taking risks and cutting corners even in pro-
viding a minimum level of oversight. First, interconnection
means that exchanges and dark pools can never be completely
immune from a crisis on their platform even if they have taken
all reasonable precautions to protect themselves. In the Na-
tional Market, exchanges and dark pools are intricately con-
nected through transactional and informational links, such
that traders and data can travel easily from one venue to the
next. Scholars have remarked on the fast flow of information
between venues, bringing high-speed efficiency to markets, but
also enormous vulnerability to errors moving rapidly from one
platform to another.2 17 This means that errors on an exchange
or dark pool can spread to other venues, creating costs that
can quickly move beyond the confines of a single trading
platform.
2 18
If an exchange does not internalize the full consequences of
its risk-taking, it can have fewer incentives to invest in oversee-
ing problem behavior on its own platform. Unlike consolidated
markets, when an exchange might expect to suffer deeply in
216 Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Charges CBOE
for Regulatory Failures (June 11, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRe
lease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171575348 [http://perma.cc/8NXJ-9UE5].
217 Gerig, supra note 35.
218 For the SEC's inquest into the convulsive markets of August 24, 2015,
which failed to offer any conclusive opinion on the causes of the causes of the
turbulence, see Securities and Exchange Commission, Equity Market Volatility on
August 24, 2015, at 2-6 (Dec. 2015), https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/re-
search/equity-market volatility.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4MP-KZX7].
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case of its own regulatory failure, fragmentation can shift a
portion of these costs to another exchange or dark pool. With
risks moving easily to another venue, an exchange has a few
options when deciding how much to invest in regulatory over-
sight: (i) it can invest heavily in ensuring that its venue is
aggressively policed, to maintain its own safety as well as that
of other venues; (ii) it can invest just enough to ensure that its
venue remains safe, but allowing risky behavior that external-
izes costs to another venue; or (iii) it can underinvest in over-
sight because risky behavior can generate profit. It does not
internalize the full cost of risk-taking as costs are also borne by
other venues. And risks from other venues can migrate to the
exchange despite the exchange's efforts to secure the exchange.
Option 1: An exchange has little motivation to invest ag-
gressively in oversight to control risks to itself and to others.
As discussed above, doing so essentially transfers value from
the exchange to a competitor.
Option 2: This option is problematic for an exchange. While
it seems appealing for an exchange to just focus on protecting
its own venue, implementing this goal is harder than it sounds.
Unless exchanges can actually control traders and force them
to trade only on their venue (rather than also on dark pools),
simply focusing on policing a single venue is near impossible in
fluid, fragmented markets.
If an exchange wishes to police risks on its venue, fragmen-
tation and interconnection in market design means that it
must also engage in some monitoring and disciplining of risks
that traders create on other venues. As above, this means that
exchanges must invest in gathering information more fully and
understanding the behavior of traders on other venues (e.g.,
are they splitting orders between the exchange and a dark
pool?). This approach can confer benefit to competitors, as
described above. It means investing time and money where the
gains are uncertain (and potentially reaped by others).
Option 3: This option benefits exchanges charged to per-
form expensive oversight. Indeed, it represents a rational allo-
cation of an exchange's regulatory resources. Exchanges that
invest even in minimal oversight of their own venue can confer
a benefit to a competing exchange. Robust oversight benefits
others and undermines an exchange's profitability. Under-
investment in discipline is more rational. For one, lax oversight
boosts profitability. It reduces the transaction costs a venue
faces. It can also encourage volume to come to an exchange.
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Fragmented markets can encourage greater risk-taking by
an exchange because it does not fully internalize the costs of its
own bad oversight. Risks spread fluidly. A disruptive trader
can cause problems across multiple venues.
Indeed, precisely because the costs of risks can be exter-
nalized to the market as a whole, single exchanges can harbor
powerful incentives to take on larger risks than they might
otherwise have done in a consolidated market. Such risky be-
havior might manifest in different ways. Exchanges might be
motivated to give traders wide latitude as a means of competing
for and attracting their business. This might include not only
opportunities to transact riskily on the exchange but also lax
enforcement for breaches. For example, exchanges routinely
try to attract high-volume traders by the promise of rebates for
their business even if the liquidity they provide may be tran-
sient and contingent on continued payment of these rebates.
To maintain their business, exchanges can give such traders
latitude in how they transact, such as through the availability
of different types of orders that can help them trade flexibly and
get ahead of others.2 19 Dependence on such traders for liquid-
ity can discourage exchanges from adopting too aggressive a
posture vis-d-vis discipline.
In any event, the costs of regulatory failure are not borne
by the exchange alone. With the National Market connecting
venues to one another, a disruption on the exchange (e.g., a
disappearance of liquidity that leads to a crash in prices) will
likely reverberate across the system. A technological glitch
may create ripples across multiple exchanges and dark pools,
requiring these other venues to take steps to protect them-
selves. An exchange has limited incentives to foresee and pro-
vision for these system-wide risks ex ante.
Finally, underinvestment in regulation can be a rational
strategy if an exchange or dark pool is inherently vulnerable to
costs created by other venues in the National Market. Ex-
changes create costs for others through suboptimal regulation.
They can also be subject to disruption resulting from another's
failure to invest in oversight.
219 Massoudi & Mackenzie, supra note 167 (noting the rise of order types and
rebates designed to capture business from dark pools). It is worth noting that
ATSs too can offer a range of order types to help ATSs to compete and attract
traders. For discussion, see Stanislav Dolgopolov, High-Frequency Trading, Order
Types, and the Evolution of the Securities Market Structure: One Whistleblower's
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 2014 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y. 145,
148-49.
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It may not always be possible to determine where and how
these risks might materialize. In a market comprising a large
number of "dark" venues, investigating and curing informa-
tional deficits can be too costly for any one venue to do by itself.
Even with transparency, interconnection between venues can
result in harms that may grow in seriousness as they prolifer-
ate across the different venues. This interdependence and vul-
nerability to unpredictable risks can encourage a sub-
optimally lax approach to oversight. If they know they can get
in trouble because of someone else's bad oversight-and pay
out for someone else's mistakes-it makes sense for exchanges
to also take profitable risks that might impose some external
costs on others. Otherwise, careful exchanges are simply ab-
sorbing the costs of others, without any real pay-off for them-
selves. Diligent exchanges face a doubly bad outcome. For
one, they are left holding the can, as other venues take risks,
make money, win business, and perpetuate problems. But,
their costs of doing business are also likely to be higher. While
others capture business because of their lower transaction
costs, diligent exchanges come out looking like expensive pro-
positions. In a market where trading services are fungible and
designed to be captured by the cheapest venue, a diligent ex-
change gets little reward for its efforts.
With unpredictable risks and fragmentation, venues collec-
tively face two broad choices: (i) to agree to invest heavily in
oversight as a means of protecting themselves and each other;
or (ii) to take risks, compete and profit-even if the costs are
borne by the system from time to time. With dark pools subject
to much lighter regulatory obligations relative to exchanges,
the first option is clearly moot. This leaves exchanges and dark
pools to compete and take risks, with the costs periodically
externalized and absorbed by the system as a whole in an ad
hoc manner. Sometimes, this institutional risk sharing can be
beneficial. This was clear in the response of the market to the
summer 2015 NYSE outage, as trading diverted smoothly to
other venues. But, it is also concerning. Venues can be sub-
ject to disruptive risks, impacting not just trading but also the
credibility of the system as a whole.
In summary, fragmentation in market design diminishes
the capacity of exchanges to exercise effective oversight. This
Article raises three areas of concern. First, fragmentation
reduces the resources and reach of exchanges to oversee and
discipline traders. Competition with cheaper, less transparent
venues has placed exchanges on the back foot, losing profit and
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power to newer upstarts. With choosier customers, exchanges
face information asymmetries and possess limited resources
with which to overcome these deficits. Secondly, these infor-
mational deficits matter because fragmented markets make
them especially costly to manage. If exchanges are supposed to
provide frontline oversight, pervasive informational gaps
should constitute a major source of concern. Yet, with dark
pools capturing large volumes of business and promising re-
duced transparency, these gaps are pervasive and near impos-
sible for any single exchange to bridge cost-effectively. Thirdly,
interconnected, fragmented venues have little incentive to in-
vest in policing or to collectively come together to oversee the
market. Rather, they can privately benefit through under-
investment. An interconnected national market encourages
venues to take risks in the provision of oversight, garnering
high private gains but shifting the fuller costs of their indis-
cipline to others in the market.
IV
THE CASE FOR LIABILITY IN MARKET DESIGN
The failure of exchange oversight and the private self-regu-
lation it represents creates systematic costs for the efficient
allocation of capital. If exchanges cannot fulfill their statutory
mandate to police traders and public companies, the market
loses a powerful source of discipline. To be sure, for-profit
exchanges have long been problematic overseers, perceived as
divided in their loyalty between their own profit margins and
their duty to public good. Despite these concerns, however,
law and regulation continue to entrust them with enormous
power to supervise the flow of risk capital in the economy. As
shown here, fragmentation in market design makes achieving
this statutory mandate close to impossible practically
This Part outlines a proposal to cure this deficit. As a
starting point, it examines the workability of returning markets
to a more consolidated structure comprising just a small hand-
ful of venues and suggests that this solution is unlikely to be
successful.
In the absence of consolidation, this Part advocates for
expanding liability for exchanges and dark pools and holding
them more directly liable for their failures in oversight. This
means removing the cover of qualified immunity for exchanges
that has allowed them to have wide latitude in the quality of
oversight they have provided. The goal of this proposal, one
that builds on my earlier writings, seeks to force exchanges
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(and dark pools) to focus more explicitly on their responsibili-
ties as market monitors. My earlier writings sought to hold
trading venues more fully liable for disruptions arising on ac-
count of automated trading practices. I build on earlier work
by suggesting that the likelihood of error and disruption is
amplified by ineffective oversight in fragmented markets.
Stronger liability can help offset the negative incentives af-
flicting venues to be lax in monitoring and enforcement. Fi-
nally, building on prior work, this Article re-emphasizes the
benefits of exchanges and dark pools contributing to a shared
fund to pay out on liability claims when a single exchanges or
dark pool cannot. In building mutual contribution to a com-
pensatory fund, the proposal encourages peer monitoring be-
tween venues to hold each other accountable for their failings
in oversight.2 2
0
A. A Return to Consolidation?
The costs of fragmentation might suggest that policy has
got things badly wrong in the last two decades. Fragmentation
erodes the major structural advantages that exchanges pos-
sess when exercising oversight, like network externalities and
deep informational reserves on traders. A proliferation of dark
pools-permitted to transact without the usual compliance
burdens that exchanges face-siphons off both high volumes of
traders as well as information on them. The threat of exclusion
is also rendered much less powerful.22 1 Exchanges are forced
to work harder on a tighter budget to fill these gaps, leaving
investors exposed to higher risks if exchanges' for-profit moti-
vations take precedence over the public good.
At first blush, this predicament points to the benefits of
pivoting back to the tried-and-tested model of consolidating
trading venues into a handful of institutions. Regulation ATS
permits a plethora of nonexchange trading venues to thrive on
account of lower entry and operating standards. From the
structural standpoint, then, one response points to the need to
rethink Regulation ATS and whether nonexchange trading ve-
nues ought to become subject to much higher entry standards
than are currently in operation. Heightened regulatory stan-
220 This Part builds on my writings in Yadav, Liability, supra note 34. Liability
proposes stronger liability levers for exchanges in the context of risks created by
algorithmic trading and the failure of traditional liability standards to effectively
constrain and punish traders for their errors, negligence, and fraud in algorithmic
trading.
221 See, e.g., Kwan, Masulis & Mclnish, supra note 180.
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dards would increase the costs of business that any ATS con-
fronts. ATS are unlikely to withstand the twin challenges of
acquiring trading volume and ensuring that users get cheap,
high-quality services at the same time. In a higher compliance
environment, ATS may struggle to develop the networks neces-
sary to sustain trading volume and the quality of services pro-
vision to influence trader preferences.
To be sure, regulators have outlined possible reforms to
tighten demands on ATS. For example, the SEC requires ATS
to disclose a much larger reserve of institutional information
about their operations than prior rules have demanded.
Whereas previously, ATS could get away with providing "rudi-
mentary" information (in the SEC's own words), reforms man-
date that ATS offer up more details about how they are run,
who uses them, special services, any rebate arrangements,
side-relationships between an ATS and any other affiliate or
organization, and so on.222 Such reforms seem well designed
to cut down on the kind of abuses perpetuated by Barclays, for
example, a firm that promised its users with a dark pool free of
aggressive HFT traders but failed to deliver.2 23
But these reforms do not challenge the fundamental notion
of off-exchange trading and the essential place of ATS as ve-
nues designed to facilitate competition. Also, these reforms do
not attack the basic lack of transparency underlying dark pool
operations: low-volume venues still do not need to publish in-
formation on available quotes. Showing that regulation wishes
to maintain a place for dark pools as a competitor to traditional
exchanges, the SEC's new rules do not change the core premise
of dark pools as venues offering investors a lightly regulated,
less open, and often cheaper proposition for trading business.
In many ways, a return to consolidation offers a compelling
solution to the costs of fragmentation. It is also one familiar to
the market. But any reform designed to radically return mar-
kets to their state of consolidation-as an answer to the prob-
lem of suboptimal exchange oversight-must reckon with the
fuller trade-offs this imposes on a market structure now accus-
tomed to fragmented trading.
For a start, securities regulation seeks to achieve a number
of goals. As part of its mission, the SEC aims to protect inves-
tors, maintain fair and orderly markets, and enable better capi-
222 See Rule 304 Reg ATS, 17 C.F.R. § 242.304 (2015); Bums et al., supra note
153.
223 See supra subparts II.A-B.
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tal formation.224 A consolidated market could well offer the
best model to achieve these goals. However, it is not obvious
that this will always be the case or be accepted as such by
scholars, policymakers, and investors. Consolidation, too, can
have drawbacks. In particular, scholars remain divided as to
whether a consolidated market structure necessarily delivers
the most optimal efficiencies and trading outcomes. As dis-
cussed in Part I, they observe that investors continue to seek
out opportunities to trade on other venues, notwithstanding
the dominance of major exchanges and their network benefits.
That is, even in consolidated markets, investors have, to vary-
ing degrees, always exercised some choice to transact outside
of an exchange.225 In looking to curb use of ATS, policy must
first determine whether preserving investor choice in market
design remains a goal worth pursuing. A few issues are worth
considering. First, one might question whether investors will
accept a reversion back to the days when the NYSE and Nasdaq
dominated almost all trading and listing. Dark pools have suc-
ceeded precisely because they appear to have provided inves-
tors with services that they could not find or did not wish to pay
for in the lit public market. While the lack of transparency is
rightly concerning from the point of view of oversight, it clearly
holds appeal for investors, driving volume and continuing in-
terest in dark pools. Besides the offer of opacity, dark pools
can also be cheaper, promising lower fees than public ex-
changes. Having enjoyed this smorgasbord of choice, it is at
least questionable whether investors will readily accept a re-
turn to a more rigid design. Indeed, Professor Larry Harris
suggests that policy should not necessarily fix on consolidation
as self-evident, given varied investor preferences and the
chance that consolidation may end up being the wrong pick.
226
Concretely, scholars have drawn mixed conclusions about
impact of dark pools on key metrics of market quality like price
efficiency. While a full discussion of this issue is outside the
scope of the Article, opinions about whether dark pools are
beneficial or harmful show deep divisions in opinion. A num-
ber of scholars point to the benefits of dark pools for market
224 See What We Do, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/about/what
wedo.shtml [http://perma.cc/Q7YR-4EQVI.
225 See O'Hara & Ye, supra note 13 (for a literature review); Madhavan, supra
note 22. As Professors Garabade and Silber note, even in consolidated markets
with some competing venues, price discovery tends to happen in the larger, con-
solidated exchanges. Garbade & Silber, supra note 74.
226 See Lawrence E. Harris, Consolidation, Fragmentation, Segmentation and
Regulation, 2 FIN. MKTS. INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 1, 4-10 (1993).
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quality. For instance, scholars point to the tendency of dark
pools to absorb more uninformed traders into their venue as a
positive. Public markets may end up better informed as a re-
sult.227 Dark pools can also help institutions dispose of large
blocks of shares without disrupting markets or immediately
disclosing investor intent.228 At the same time, others express
reserve, pointing out, for example, that excessive fragmenta-
tion in markets can damage liquidity on lit exchanges.229 In
all, firm assessments of the merits of dark pools versus ex-
changes are elusive, viewed at least from the perspective of
empirical finance scholarship.
These uncertainties create complex trade-offs for proposals
to return to a more consolidated market. This Article demon-
strates the enormous challenges-and costs-that fragmenta-
tion creates for market oversight. Taken broadly, some may
suggest that these costs are offset by the gains for investor
choice, or the possible benefits that dark pools provide for mar-
ket quality. Combined with path dependencies generated over
the two decades during which investors have enjoyed greater
choice, a dramatic about-turn toward consolidation starts to
look unfeasible.
B. A Case for Liability
Short of structural consolidation, trading venues can be
pushed toward better oversight by a stronger threat of legal
liability and a collective liability between exchanges and dark
pools for market-wide harms. Historically, exchanges have en-
joyed wide immunity from liability in the performance of their
regulatory functions-a qualified immunity in return for per-
forming the public good of policing.230
The critical importance of exchanges, however, means that
their failings can carry high financial and expressive conse-
quence. A systematic degree of error, misinformation and
fraud can impact the value of securities and leave investors
227 See, e.g., Zhu, supra note 168.
228 See Peter Gomber et al., Competition Between Equity Markets: Evidence
from the Consolidation Versus Fragmentation Debate, 31 J. ECON. SURvS. 792, 802
(2017).
229 See Kwan, Masulis, Mclnish, supra note 180, at 6-7 (discussing mixed
conclusions).
230 See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. NASD, Inc., 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir.
1998); Barbara v. New York Stock Exchange, 99 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996). But see
Weissman v. NASD, Inc. (Weissman IV), 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11 th Cir. 2007).
See generally Springer, supra note 5, at 465 (discussing exculpating Nasdaq from
liability).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and public companies to bear the costs of an exchange's poor
oversight-hurting capital allocation. Investors-at-large and
public companies are generally inefficient monitors and cannot
be relied on to internalize the costs of exchanges falling short in
their statutory oversight duty. Moreover, statute is clear in
giving exchanges an expansive role in oversight. While consoli-
dated exchanges might have had advantages, fragmentation
does not absolve them of this role. However, fragmentation
does raise structural challenges to the exercise of oversight. In
the absence of consolidation, it follows that the application of
the statutory mandate must now adapt to the reality of frag-
mented markets.
Liability for Trading Venues: This Article shows that over-
sight is undermined in three key ways: (i) exchanges carry the
main weight of liability relative to dark pools, but see an ever-
diminishing fraction of trading volume. With less money and
fewer traders, oversight is compromised; (ii) exchanges cannot
effectively monitor other venues; and (iii) the National Market
creates incentives for venues to privately profit from risks at a
cost to the system has a whole.
This analysis points to the desirability of moving to a
framework in which exchanges and dark pools are able to: (i)
better internalize the costs of suboptimal governance; and (ii)
develop incentives to monitor each other alongside systematic
tools that facilitate this self-policing.
Risk sharing between exchanges and ATS points to the
desirability of imposing liability for oversight failures on both
dark pools as well as on exchanges.23 1 This necessitates
grounding this liability within the context of a broader duty to
police markets, applying not only to exchanges but also to dark
pools. While dark pools might continue to benefit from regula-
tory leeway (e.g., in the lack of transparency), enlarging the
scope of the oversight mandate to cover dark pools as well as
exchanges makes sense from the policy standpoint. Dark pools
host traders in the same National Market securities as ex-
changes. Moreover, risks can spread from dark pools to ex-
changes (and vice versa) given common informational and
logistical connections. A marked asymmetry in the policing
burden carried by exchanges and dark pools thus appears for-
malistic. Just as exchanges are required to ensure that they
assure compliance with securities laws and prevent fraud and
manipulation, similar requirements ought to be expressly ex-
231 See Yadav, Liability, supra note 34.
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tended to dark pools. Regulators have proposed measures re-
quiring dark pools to disclose more about detail about their
operations. It seems fitting to also deepen their role in over-
sight as a means of ensuring that dark pools precommit to a
basic standard of organizational form, leaving venues free to
compete on other services. This might mean, for example, that
dark pools also ensure compliance with securities laws, partic-
ularly as these relate to fraud, manipulation, and insider trad-
ing. Given the lack of transparency on dark pools, an explicit
assumption of legal duty to prevent misbehavior and miscon-
duct can offset the risks of traders utilizing dark pools for su-
pervisory arbitrage and deceptive behavior. In addition, dark
pools might vet those that utilize their venue more strictly.
Differing entry standards between dark pools and exchanges
encourage less-qualified traders to utilize dark pools for poten-
tially risky trading. If dark pools do not wish to invest in vetting
traders, they might instead rely on existing exchanges to certify
traders and for this certification to then qualify traders to
transact freely across dark pools.
Rather than giving trading venues latitude and immunity,
as the law has done, the risks from competing venues point
toward the benefits of imposing liability in case of oversight
failures by trading platforms. The scope of this liability is set to
be deliberately broad. In past work, I have suggested that ex-
changes be held secondarily liable, on a liability basis, for in-
stances of error, negligence, or fraud occurring in automated
markets, where the trader causing this harm is unable to cover
the losses. In other words, exchanges stand ready to cover the
shortfall in cases where traders are unable to pay for the dam-
age they cause on their venue. In addition, and in some in-
stances separately, liability may be imposed for instances
where exchanges have fallen short in their exercise of their
oversight functions and caused losses for investors in the
market.
First, an ex post compensation mechanism aims to foster
better ex ante incentives for exchanges and dark pools to be
rigorous in oversight. Venues may be to blame in cases where
traders cause large losses. When traders make costly mis-
takes-so large that they cannot pay for it themselves-ex-
change/dark pool oversight failures are likely to blame. Why
was a trader permitted to take on risks that for which she could
not adequately provision? Why were these risks able to materi-
alize in a systemically damaging and costly manner? Why did
monitoring mechanisms fail to detect instances of egregious
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trader misbehavior? To the extent that exchanges and dark
pools have their own pocketbooks on the line, one might expect
them to attack instances of misbehavior more forcefully ex
ante.
But exchanges may be separately liable for suboptimal
oversight of markets-unconnected to harm caused by traders.
This might happen, for example, if exchanges install poor qual-
ity infrastructure, if they put their own business interests con-
spicuously ahead of the public good (e.g., CBOE) or if the
failure to coordinate between venues contributes to deeper,
more damaging harms to the market. Put more simply, ex-
changes and dark pools should be seen to have, and actually
have, a tangible stake in market oversight. This should im-
prove market monitoring as well as encourage greater confi-
dence on the part of regulators and investors in the ability of
trading venues to fulfill their statutory mandate.
Secondly, the threat of ex post liability can reduce the in-
centives of exchanges and dark pools to take profitable risks at
the expense of the market system. Venues may be willing to
overlook instances of misbehavior on their platforms to attract
volume, lowering transaction costs for themselves and building
a profitable user base. In this context, the threat of liability for
a dark pools and exchange can provide a corrective to these
distorted incentives. By imposing costs on any motivation to
riskily oversee the market, liability levers can reduce the incli-
nation of trading venues to extract private benefit at a cost to
the market as a whole.
Collective Liability and Monitoring: In earlier work refer-
enced above, I proposed establishing a Market Disruption
Fund, representing a shared fund financed by exchanges to
help defray the costs of damage in cases where a single ex-
change cannot pay out.2 3 2 Underlying this proposal is the con-
cern that a single venue may not always have the resources to
pay out on a large claim in an interconnected market. A prob-
lem might start on one exchange or dark pools and then mush-
room across several venues, leading to a large claim. If the
liability regime underlying market structure lacks resources, it
lacks the credibility to constrain bad actors or to assure inves-
tors about the protective potential of exchange oversight. In
seeking to encourage better collective monitoring and over-
sight, such a Fund ought to include contributions by dark
pools and exchanges.
232 See Yadav, Liability, supra note 34.
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This Fund can support losses caused by failures of over-
sight by exchanges and dark pools. The design would fulfill
three key criteria: (i) compensate investors that lose on account
of a failure by an exchange or dark pools to meet its oversight
responsibilities; (ii) reduce bad incentives on the part of ex-
changes or dark pools to take risks knowing that the Fund is
available to pay out on a claim; and (iii) force exchanges and
dark pools to actively monitor each other as a means of private
discipline.
With respect to (i) and (ii) above, a Fund might require that
all venues participating in the trading of NMS securities con-
tribute to its reserve in accordance with a set of established
criteria (e.g., by proportion of equity volume, past record of
good oversight). In the event of a covered loss, the Fund can
pay out to an aggrieved investor or other party, first dipping
into the reserves of any trader that is misbehaving and then the
main venue where the bad trader was active before then using
up contributions by other venues. If one or more venues are
implicated, the Fund can assess joint liability for more than
one venue.
Importantly, to reduce moral hazard on the part of venues,
caused because venues gain the support of an industry-wide
disruption fund, payments will first be made by the most cul-
pable venue. To the extent these venues are not wiped out by
liability, the Fund may require them to pay in extra funds after
the fact in acknowledgement of their deficiency. Much like
tried-and-tested mechanisms in insurance, the Fund repre-
sents a mechanism for the market to protect itself against risk,
to make good on any losses and to reduce the chances of bad
actors to behave disruptively owing to this backstop.
Importantly, with respect to (iii), such a Fund would create
an institutional mechanism to incentivize venues to better po-
lice one another. This Article shows that exchanges and ark
pools cannot easily verify that others are conducting oversight
effectively. A shared liability fund can motivate exchanges and
dark pools to better oversee each other's conduct. An industry
fund should also provide an institutional locus of common in-
terests. It can push venues to cooperate in the exercise of
market oversight, to share information and pool monitoring
resources. Underlying this motivation is the expectation that
industry self-policing can help to discover and root out weak
links in the National Market. Institutions that cannot contrib-
ute to the Fund or those that show up as responsible for re-
peated failures ought to see reputational sanction as well as
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industry discipline, designed to eventually price them out of
the market (e.g., through individual liability, higher contribu-
tions to the Fund/sanction by public regulators). To some ex-
tent, an example of some institutional cooperation is offered by
FINRA, the industry self-regulator. However, without skin-in-
the-game through private liability and financial interdepen-
dence through shared liability, incentives to exercise industry
self-monitoring and discipline are too weak to be workable. In
this absence, the market cannot continue to rely on exchange
oversight as a central pillar of the regulation.
CONCLUSION
By statute, exchanges are tasked with overseeing securi-
ties markets and assuring compliance with applicable laws and
industry standards. With policy favoring competition in the
delivery of trading services, however, recent years have seen
heavy fragmentation in market structure, characterized by a
proliferation of exchanges as well as lightly regulated dark
pools. While fragmentation offers investors choice in how to
trade as well as reduced transaction costs, it has also rendered
it near impossible, in practice, for exchanges to oversee the
marketplace. Lower trading revenues, fierce competition, and
incentives to take profitable risks have severely diminished the
capacity of exchanges to fulfill their supervisory duty. This
Article takes a first step to restore the efficacy of exchange
oversight and to better realize the goals of statute. In proposing
a new liability regime for trading venues, it reframes the cost-
benefit trade-off that platforms face when calibrating the inten-
sity of oversight. By ensuring that there is a real cost for ve-
nues that neglect good governance, liability can help align
private incentives toward the public good. In so doing, over-
sight failure in securities markets can be confronted and con-
trolled, ensuring gains for investor protection and efficient
capital allocation in the marketplace.
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